A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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It becomes evident that Durkheim advances to a deeper level of argumentation, founded on the sociological premise that the individual cannot exist in isolation from society. Viewed in isolation, the individual is merely an abstraction, whereas in reality, it is only the social whole that truly exists. Therefore, an individual who rejects the morality of their time—who claims there is no foundation for morality—is essentially denying society itself, positioning themselves as if existing outside of it. Durkheim counters this notion with three distinct, albeit possibly contradictory, arguments:

Firstly, as we have established, it is impossible to live outside society. The question is not whether one can exist independently of society, but rather in which society one wishes to live. 1.
Alternatively, rejecting society equates to expressing a desire to die; thus, Durkheim adds: It remains to be examined whether man should deny himself; the question is legitimate, but will not be examined. It will be assumed that we are right to want to live 2.
Or, finally, it amounts to wanting to cease being a man: We cannot get out of society without losing our humanity [...] We can only renounce it by renouncing ourselves 3.

We observe that moral sociologism offers a foundation for morality (society, and the social conditions that give rise to a given rule). However, this foundation is relative: a moral rule that is justified today may no longer be justified tomorrow if social conditions evolve, removing its basis, at which point it would need to be abandoned. Thus, no rule is grounded in an absolute sense. The intriguing aspect of this doctrine is how it reconciles objectivism with relativism, concepts we might typically view as opposing.

Conversely, we observe an ambiguity in Durkheim's approach. He claims not to judge the morality of a given time but only to explain it, yet he simultaneously proposes a foundation for it. This ambiguity manifests in the two concepts Durkheim uses to evaluate a moral rule: the 'normal' and the 'pathological'. Durkheim deliberately avoids the concept of 'value,' which would reveal his intent to judge morality rather than merely explain it. Consequently, he does not ask whether a moral rule has inherent value but whether it is 'normal' or 'pathological'. A pathological law is one that persists despite the disappearance of the social cause that once justified it, while a normal law is one that aligns with, or is generated by, the social state of its time.

Chapter III of The Rules of Sociological Method is largely devoted to the rhetorical effort of assessing a phenomenon’s worth without explicitly using the concept of 'value'. The concept of 'normality' enables this subtle illusion: it avoids the direct invocation of 'value' while covertly allowing an implicit judgment of a phenomenon’s worth.

If we separate the concept of normality from any value judgments, 'being normal' means only 'being frequent'. This is how Durkheim interprets the term. However, by denying any value association with normality, Durkheim encounters unresolved paradoxes—such as the claim that crime is normal in society. Essentially, Durkheim is merely stating, 'Crime is frequent in society,' since, for him, 'normal' means nothing beyond frequent (or general, in relation to a given species). Yet the paradox emerges because the concept of normality remains intrinsically linked to value, despite Durkheim's attempts to disentangle the two.

An essential feature of moral sociologism is its attempt to avoid overt value judgments while subtly reintroducing them through concepts like 'normality' and 'pathology' (we might also note the term 'reactionary', which, under an objective guise—someone adhering to moral rules whose conditions have disappeared—contains an implicit value judgment). Moral sociologism is therefore marked by the adoption of multiple axiological positions (or value judgments) and a deliberate effort to obscure them.

However, it is this avoidance of the concept of value that appears to prevent moral sociologism from establishing a true foundation for morality. Like Nietzsche, sociologism seems only to uncover the origin of morality, tracing moral rules to specific social conditions. Yet, for these rules to demand adherence—that is, to ground morality itself—it would be necessary to demonstrate that these moral rules possess intrinsic value (and not merely conditions).
Furthermore, it would require showing that these social conditions themselves hold value. Durkheim demonstrates that certain moralities are necessary for the survival of specific societies. But what is his response to the immoralist who argues, 'What holds value is the dissolution of that society (or of society in general)' or 'Society has no value, and thus neither does morality'? Durkheim shows that individualism is unfeasible, that individuals cannot exist apart from society. Yet, even if we accept this contested premise, how might one respond to someone who claims, 'The individual is indeed an impossibility, a mere illusion, but the illusory or the impossible has greater value than the real'?

It is clear that moral sociologism relies on a series of unproven value judgements, a fact Durkheim implicitly acknowledges when he presents one as a postulate: It remains to be examined whether man should deny himself [by leaving society]; the question is legitimate, but it will not be examined. We will postulate that we are right to want to live 4.
A foundation for morality cannot be established through a series of unfounded value judgements; at best, these offer only opinions about morality. The failure of moral sociologism thus appears as yet another example—following Nietzsche—of the impossibility of deriving a moral foundation from its (in this case, social) origin.

1. Sociology and philosophy, chap. II
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.