Book II/ Prolegomena to Axiology

If we aim to establish the legitimacy of axiology, we must naturally address several questions: 'What is the content of this discipline?', 'What is its relevance?', 'What is its method?', 'What are its connections with other sciences?', and most importantly, 'What are its outcomes?' Where should our inquiry begin?

We must defer an examination of the discipline's content, since we first need to address its external and auxiliary characteristics before approaching its core aspects. I refer to these preliminary characteristics as the 'prolegomena' of axiology (pro legomein: that which comes before), and it is these I now propose to explore.

To this end, it seems appropriate to begin by offering a definition—albeit a provisional one—of the concept of value. This will lead us to ask whether our era is ready to embrace the very project of axiology—as a discipline concerned with the value defined above. In other words, we will attempt to sketch an axiological panorama of our time. We will then consider the cast of mind that axiology research requires if it is to be understood and accepted. This will ultimately allow us to envisage what reconfiguration of the field of knowledge might follow from establishing axiology as a science of values.

I/ Provisional Definition of Value

We need to define the concept of value we intend to use, though this will initially be a provisional definition. Much of our work will involve gradually refining this notion of value. Nonetheless, we must begin with some preliminary understanding, which I will now attempt to outline.

It seems that the concept of value should capture a particular intuition—or rather two related intuitions. The first is the belief in a universal hierarchy encompassing all beings, things, and actions—or, more generally, all entities. This intuition holds that certain behaviours or things are superior or inferior to others and thus belong within a hierarchy: the hierarchy of values. In this sense, the intuition lends the concept of value an objective character, since it raises the question of how hierarchy relates to the external world.

The concept of value can also articulate a second intuition: that certain things are worthy of love. To say that nature has value would ultimately mean that nature is worthy of love. This captures the subjective dimension of the concept of value, engaging human emotions—and in particular the emotion of love.

This remains a provisional definition, as it is logically unsatisfactory: the notion of hierarchy, through which we define value, already presupposes the concept of value. We are therefore attempting to explain value by invoking a term that itself requires an understanding of value. Similarly, the notion of dignity—implicit in the phrase 'worthy of love'—also fundamentally depends on the concept of value. There is, then, a logical circularity here. We will nonetheless accept this preliminary definition for the time being, as it helps illuminate the concept of value through two intuitions that will aid our understanding until we can arrive at a more coherent account.

With this provisional understanding of value in hand, we may now ask: does the project of axiology resonate with our times? This prompts us to explore the relationship to values that characterises our own era.