Book II/ Prolegomena to Axiology

If we aim to establish the legitimacy of axiology, we must naturally address several questions: 'What is the content of this discipline?', 'What is its relevance?', 'What is its method?', 'What are its connections with other sciences?', and most importantly, 'What are its outcomes?' Where should our inquiry begin?

We must postpone an examination of the discipline’s content, as we first need to address its external and auxiliary characteristics before approaching its core aspects. I refer to these preliminary characteristics as the 'prolegomena' of axiology (pro legomein: that which comes before), and it is these I now propose to explore.

To this end, it seems appropriate to start by offering a definition—albeit a provisional one—of the concept of value. This will lead us to question whether our era is ready to embrace the very project of axiology—as a discipline concerned with the value defined above. In other words, we will attempt to outline an axiological panorama of our time. We will then consider the state of mind that axiology research requires for it to be understood and accepted. Ultimately, this will allow us to envision what reconfiguration of the field of knowledge might emerge from establishing axiology as a science of values.

I/ Provisional Definition of Value

We need to define the concept of value that we intend to use, though this will initially be a provisional definition. Much of our work will involve gradually refining this notion of value. Nonetheless, we must start with some preliminary understanding, which I will now attempt to outline.

It seems that the concept of value should capture a particular intuition, or rather two related intuitions. The first of these is the belief in a universal hierarchy encompassing all beings, things, and actions—or, more generally, all entities. This intuition holds that certain behaviours or things are superior or inferior to others and thus belong within a hierarchy, the hierarchy of values. In this sense, this intuition gives the concept of value an objective character, as it raises the question of how hierarchy relates to the external world.

The concept of value can also articulate a second intuition: that certain things are worthy of love. To say that nature has value would ultimately mean that nature is worthy of love. This expresses the subjective aspect of the concept of value, engaging human emotions, particularly the emotion of love.

This remains a provisional definition, as it is logically unsatisfactory: the notion of hierarchy, through which we define value, already assumes the concept of value. We are therefore attempting to explain value by invoking a term that presupposes an understanding of value. Similarly, the notion of dignity—used in the phrase 'worthy of love'—also fundamentally requires the concept of value for comprehension. There is, then, a logical circularity here. However, we will accept this preliminary definition for now, as it helps illuminate the concept of value through these two intuitions, which will aid our understanding until we can arrive at a more coherent definition

With this provisional understanding of value, we can now consider: does the project of axiology resonate with our times? This prompts us to explore the relationship to values that characterises our own era.