Book II/ Prolegomena to axiology

If we want to establish the legitimacy of axiology, we naturally have to answer a number of questions: "What is the content of this discipline?", "What is its interest?", "What is its method?", "What are its links with other sciences?", and above all: "What is its result?" Where should we begin our research?

The examination of the content of this discipline must wait, because we must first look at the external and accessory characteristics of this discipline before trying to grasp its essential characteristics. It is these inessential characteristics that I call the "prolegomena" of axiology (pro legomein: what comes before), and which I now propose to examine.

For this, it seems appropriate to begin by proposing a definition - at least a provisional one - of the concept of value. This will then lead us to ask whether our era can accept the very project of an axiology (as a discipline whose object is the value thus defined) - in other words, we will seek to draw up an axiological panorama of our era. We will then be in a position to take an interest in the state of mind that the researcher's axiology requires in order to be understood and accepted. Ultimately, this will enable us to try to imagine what reconfiguration of the field of knowledge might result from the constitution of axiology as a science of values.

I/ Provisional definition of value

We need to define the concept of value that we are going to use, but I am only going to give a provisional definition. All our work will consist of gradually developing this notion of value. However, we do need to give some idea of it, which is what I am now going to try to do.

It seems to me that the notion of value should be used to formulate a certain intuition, or rather two related intuitions. The first of these intuitions is that there is a universal hierarchy of all beings, things and actions, and to use the most general term, a hierarchy of all entities. It is the intuition that certain behaviours, or certain things, are better than others, are superior or inferior, and are therefore included in a hierarchy, in the hierarchy of values. In a way, this constitutes the objective character of the notion of value, in the sense that it raises problem of the relation of hierarchy to the outside world. The notion of value can also be used to formulate a second intuition: that certain things are worthy of love. To say that nature has value would be to say, ultimately, that nature is worthy of love. This is the subjective nature of the notion of value, which appeals to human feelings, and more specifically to the feeling of love.

This can only be a provisional definition, because it is unsatisfactory from a logical point of view: the notion of hierarchy, through which we have defined value, already carries within it the notion of value. We are therefore trying to understand the notion of value, and we can only explain it using a term whose understanding already requires an understanding of the concept of value.

Similarly, the notion of dignity - used in the expression "to be worthy of love" - fundamentally requires the notion of value in order to be understood. There is a logical vicious circle here. Nevertheless, we will content ourselves with this provisional definition for the moment, because it has the merit of illuminating the notion of value with these two intuitions, which will help our understanding until we can propose a more consistent definition of value.

Armed with this definition of value, albeit an imperfect one, we can ask ourselves: can the project of an axiology fit into our times, that is, be accepted by us? This leads us to try to grasp the relationship to values that characterises our own era.