II/ The Consequences of Confusing Ethics and Axiology

1/ The Oblivion of Value

The confusion of the concept of value with related notions has produced a unique phenomenon: the oblivion of value. The history of the concept of value can be described as the history of its oblivion, right from its inception: the history of its appearance is perhaps at the same time the history of its disappearance. More fundamentally, the problem that arises from its genuine meaning—the problem of values—disappears because it is framed using concepts that can only address entirely different questions.

I have supported the idea of the disappearance of the concept of 'value' in favour of the concept of 'good', for example. In fact, the term 'disappearance' is inappropriate, as disappearance presupposes prior appearance. From its earliest formulation, the problem of values has been framed in terms of 'good' (agathon); a question betrayed - and therefore closed - as soon as it was posed. In the same way, we cannot speak of oblivion, nor loss, of what has never presented itself as memory, nor as gain.

Nevertheless, we will retain this convenient expression: the oblivion of value appears to be the main outcome of the long sequence of conceptual confusions to which this concept has been subjected.
This phenomenon seems to be detectable, like an illness, by its symptoms. In other words, a sharp eye can discover, in the flow of contemporary events, a certain number of signs that reveal such forgetfulness. We now aim to identify and interpret some of these signs.

2/ The Misfortune of the Term 'Axiology'

One of the first obvious signs that value has been forgotten is the lack of interest in the term 'axiology'. How often is this term encountered in secondary school or university education?
The number of publications in the moral or ethical field each year is overwhelming compared with the number of axiological publications. Similarly, the number of theses in axiology is infinitesimal compared with the number of theses about ethics.
Moreover, works that include the term 'axiology' often treat it as synonymous with 'ethics' and incorporate moral concepts such as 'end,' 'good,' 'meaning of life,' etc.

As Ruyer observed: Perhaps because the theory of values, or axiology, was not developed by a single great philosopher but rather by a host of distinguished thinkers working independently, we notice a disparity among works dealing with the subject of value. When you open a book on value, you do not know whether you will find: 1. a treatise on theology (Lossky) 2. a treatise on psychology (R.B. Perry) 3. a treatise on sociology (Bouglé) 4. a treatise on political economy (Fr Perroux) 5. a treatise on logic (Lalande) 6. a treatise on morality (Scheler) 7. a treatise on general philosophy (R. Polin) 8. a treatise on general physics (Köhler) ¹.
What is striking about Ruyer's list is that it does not mention the possibility that, upon 'opening a book on value', one might find a treatise on axiology(!).

1. Philosophie de la valeur