II/ The Consequences of Confusing Ethics and Axiology

1/ The Oblivion of Value

The confusion of the concept of value with related notions has produced a singular phenomenon: the oblivion of value. The history of the concept of value can be described as the history of its oblivion from the very outset: the history of its appearance is perhaps simultaneously the history of its disappearance. More fundamentally, the problem that arises from its genuine meaning—the problem of values—disappears because it is framed using concepts that can only address entirely different questions.

I have argued for the disappearance of the concept of 'value' in favour of the concept of 'good', for instance. In fact, the term 'disappearance' is itself misleading, since disappearance presupposes a prior appearance. From its earliest formulation, the problem of values has been framed in terms of 'good' (agathon)—a question betrayed, and therefore closed, as soon as it was posed. In the same way, we cannot speak of the oblivion, or the loss, of what has never presented itself as memory, nor as a gain.

We will nonetheless retain this convenient expression: the oblivion of value appears to be the principal outcome of the long sequence of conceptual confusions to which this concept has been subjected.
This phenomenon seems detectable, like an illness, by its symptoms. A discerning eye can identify, in the flow of contemporary events, a number of signs that betray such forgetfulness. We now aim to identify and interpret some of these signs.

2/ The Misfortune of the Term 'Axiology'

One of the most obvious signs that value has been forgotten is the lack of interest in the term 'axiology'. How often is this term encountered in secondary school or university education?
The number of publications in the moral or ethical field each year vastly outweighs the number of axiological publications. Similarly, the number of theses in axiology is negligible compared with those devoted to ethics.
Moreover, works that do include the term 'axiology' often treat it as synonymous with 'ethics', drawing on moral concepts such as 'end', 'good', 'meaning of life', and so on.

As Ruyer observed: Perhaps because the theory of values, or axiology, was not developed by a single great philosopher but rather by a host of distinguished thinkers working independently, we notice a disparity among works dealing with the subject of value. When you open a book on value, you do not know whether you will find: 1. a treatise on theology (Lossky) 2. a treatise on psychology (R.B. Perry) 3. a treatise on sociology (Bouglé) 4. a treatise on political economy (Fr Perroux) 5. a treatise on logic (Lalande) 6. a treatise on morality (Scheler) 7. a treatise on general philosophy (R. Polin) 8. a treatise on general physics (Köhler) ¹.
What is striking about Ruyer's list is that it does not include the possibility that, upon opening a book on value, one might find a treatise on axiology (!).

1. Philosophie de la valeur