Like the ethics of duty, which establish the meaning of duty without demonstrating anything about its value, the ethics of happiness perhaps succeed in establishing that morality makes us happy, without demonstrating anything about the value of human happiness.
The idea that human existence and human happiness have a value may be true, but it cannot be accepted as a postulate because it is precisely the idea that evil contests, and therefore the idea that must absolutely be proven in order to counter it. To accept it as self-evident is not only to enter into an anthropocentrism in which man is never troubled by doubt as to the value of his existence, and asserts himself as representing the pinnacle of Creation, but it is above all, it seems to us, to fail to understand what really needs to be done to refute immoralism.
It is not, therefore, in the ethics of happiness that we will find an answer to the question of the foundation of morality, because these doctrines seem to ask other questions: "How can happiness be achieved?", "What is really useful?", and use the concept of "end", of "desirable", when we should be using the concept of "value".
It seems, then, that we need to look in other directions if we are to find an answer to our question. A hypothesis emerges: to find the foundation of morality, wouldn't we have to conduct a "genealogy of morality", in other words, uncover the origin of morality? This is the hypothesis we will now examine.