It would be excessive to delve into the formation of axiological intuitionism and particularly into the influence that epistemological or moral intuitionism may have had on its emergence.
For example, we might consider Pascal's 'spirit of finesse', in contrast to the 'geometrical spirit' and Père Bouhours' notion of 'je ne sais quoi' as distant prefigurations of this intuition. Similarly, in debates among 17th-century English intuitionists (Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Reid) on morality, the question arises: is immediate access to an objective dimension of moral facts enabled by an intellectual faculty, a kind of sensitivity or 'moral sense', or by a consciousness that integrates both reason and sense?

Lavelle seems to provide an ideal description of axiological intuitionism in his Traité des valeurs.
Lavelle begins by noting that axiological intuition is not merely passive contemplation but active participation in the value it intuits: Value is never given in such a way that there is a guaranteed experience that enables one to grasp it. Those who do not participate in value, as evidenced by aesthetic insensitivity, will never truly understand what it is. Value is invisible and elusive, revealing itself only to those who actively seek and cherish it. It becomes clear, then, why value escapes those who attempt to seize it like a mere object; such an approach would be akin to a violation. It can only be perceived by the delicacy of the soul; it remains the same everywhere, yet manifests in new nuances with each encounter ¹.

This 'active' intuition, rather than a passive one, prompts Lavelle to describe not a problem of values but rather their self-evidence: Value has a self-evidence, much like truth, beyond which one cannot retreat. […] It is absurd to think that the mind can progress by questioning the value of value, the being of being, or the thought of thought. This leads to a form of repetition or a logical circle ².

Lavelle then asserts that this evidence arises within us through a kind of natural light, borrowing a term from Cartesian philosophy: The value judgement presupposes a unique light that reveals it to us, one that no discursive reasoning or external testimony can produce. In its absence, we are blind to value. It is clear that no one can judge value except by relying on a principle they carry deep within themselves ³.

From this perspective, reasoning, or even a simple value judgement, serves only to clarify these intuitions and make their meaning explicit, rather than to uncover additional meanings: One could say that there is a feeling of value, and that the true function of all value judgements is to analyse it rather than to justify it. [...] This feeling may be obscure at first, but it is the intellect that takes possession of it. The intellect invents nothing. Its role is not to define what is true, beautiful, or good, but to recognise and purify them, ensuring that no foreign elements are mixed in ⁴.

Mehl also supports this subordinate view of value judgement: Reasoning plays only a secondary and, in a sense, apologetic role. […] I can certainly deepen my understanding of values, and through analysis refine their definition, but I cannot know anything beyond what was initially given to me. I grasp it all at once, in its unity and totality; this unified knowledge compels me to speak of the intuition of values ⁵.

If we reply to the intuitionist by stating that some people (myself included) lack this intuition, they will, with a touch of sympathy, speak of 'value blindness', akin to 'colour blindness' in the visually impaired. Mehl concludes: Since there is value blindness, it follows that there must be value intuition ⁶. Thus, any attempt by the axiologist to grasp the value of things becomes futile, as it would resemble a blind person trying to perceive the colours of objects through judgement and proof.

1. Traité des valeurs, livre II, 2nde partie, ch.4, X
2. Ibid., livre II, 5ème partie, ch.3, VI
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., livre II, 5ème partie, ch.3, IX
5. De l'autorité des valeurs, ch. II
6. Ibid.