2/ The Hierarchies Proposed by Intuitionism

Several hierarchies have been put forward as intuitively certain or, at the very least, self-evident.

Anselm of Canterbury argued that it is self-evident that a horse in its nature is better than a piece of wood, and […] a human being is superior to a horse ¹.
Much later, Hans Jonas returned to this intuition, proposing that a being driven by the pursuit of an end is plainly superior to one that has none: We can regard the mere capacity to have any purposes at all as a good-in-itself, of which we grasp with intuitive certainty that it is infinitely superior to any purposelessness of being ². At the lowest level of this hierarchy, then, stands the inorganic existence of dead matter.

In The Methods of Ethics, H. Sidgwick argues that utilitarianism rests on at least one intuition: I obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one person is no more important from the point of view […] of the universe than the good of any other. And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am obliged to aim at good generally… rather than at any particular part of it ³.

In Natural Law and Natural Rights, John Finnis contends that a set of seven 'fundamental values' can be identified across diverse social strata—values he believes would be recognised as self-evident by all: art, science, religion, human life, conviviality and friendship, play, and practical reason.

Scheler takes a more cautious approach in describing the hierarchy of values that intuition—or rather 'preference'—discloses to him. He begins by acknowledging the expectations that his concept of 'preference' naturally arouses in the reader: We expect an ethics first of all to furnish us with an explicit determination of 'higher' and 'lower' in the order of values, a determination that is itself based on the contents of the essences of values ⁴. Yet Scheler curiously observes that It is not our aim at this point in the discussion to furnish such a determination ⁵.
He nonetheless agrees to define the 'value-modalities', understood as an order of ranks among the system of qualities of non-formal values ⁶. The kinds of a priori orders among values would accordingly be (from inferior to superior):
1/ values of the pleasant/unpleasant
2/ values of vital feeling
3/ spiritual values: beautiful/ugly, just/unjust, true/false
4/ and finally, sacred/profane values

These represent the ultimate axiological modalities—in other words, if we interpret this somewhat obscure formulation correctly, something sacred holds a higher value than something merely pleasant.

What, then, does intuitionism have to say to someone who denies this hierarchy or calls into question the value of something presented as self-evidently worthwhile?
The intuitionist can only accuse such a person of dishonesty, or even of abnormality or perversity. Brentano unreservedly endorses Aristotle's claim that everyone desires knowledge ⁷. How, then, is one to respond to someone who denies that knowledge has any value?

Consider Brentano's view: There exists a higher kind of pleasure and displeasure. [Consider Aristotle's example]: All men naturally desire knowledge. In our species, [this pleasure] is universal. If there were another species with different preferences from ours regarding sensible qualities, yet which loved error for its own sake and hated insight, we would certainly not say, as we might in the former case, that this was a matter of taste. Rather, we would decisively conclude that such love and hatred were fundamentally absurd, as this species would hate what is undeniably good and love what is undeniably bad in itself. Similarly, we prefer joy (unless it is joy in something bad) to sadness. If there were beings who preferred the opposite, we would rightly regard such conduct as perverse ⁸

As this makes clear, the intuitionist never concedes any validity to axiological doctrines that fall outside his intuition. He proceeds with certainty, having secured what he takes to be knowledge from the outset. He believes he has found the solution even before any genuine problem of values has been posed. The immoralist or nihilist need not be refuted; they do not even deserve to be heard.

Some thinkers have, however, voiced opposition to axiological intuitionism. It is now appropriate to set out their counterarguments.

1. Monologion, ch.4
2. The Imperative of Responsibility, PV 154
3. Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, 1st part, II, B, 4
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. II, B, 5
6. Ibid.
7. Metaphysics I, 1
8. The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong