Formal axiologies likely represent an advance beyond intuitionism.
They at least acknowledge the existence of a problem of values and assume that a discipline specifically dedicated to addressing it is necessary.
Furthermore, by refraining from any attempt to determine what is or is not valuable and focusing instead on the formal laws underlying axiology, they rest on a suspension (epoché) of value judgements, thereby acknowledging that values remain unfounded.
However, formal axiologies are inherently limited by their own scope: they do not aim to disclose any truth about the content of axiology itself (i.e., what does or does not possess value) but merely seek to establish a formal framework within which axiology might operate.
Their epoché does not simply subject all values to critical reappraisal; it suspends the axiological question altogether.
Thus, as with intuitionism, the problem of values does not genuinely arise here, since this approach excludes any reflection on the substantive content of value judgements. As Husserl himself notes: What is good cannot be decided formaliter, any more than what is true can be determined by formal logic alone, nor can one formaliter decide what is objectively best or practically required
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Following Brentano, then, we understand that the existence of a positive value X is itself a positive value, yet we are unable to identify which specific X possesses positive value.
In short, formal axiology faces a dilemma: either it retains its purely 'formal' character—in which case it is incapable of resolving, or even posing, the problem of values—or one attempts to derive axiological content from these formal axioms. The latter, however, seems impracticable, since nothing within the axioms as observed enables us to identify the X with a positive existence or whose value could complement that of Y.
Formal axiologies, grounded in the act of epoché, also aspire to transcend all presuppositions; yet this aim does not appear to be achieved.
Rather than conceiving of axiology as an autonomous discipline with its own distinctive methods and concepts, formal axiologies are modelled on mathematical or geometrical frameworks (or, in Husserl's case, on logic), relying on deductively connected propositions derived from axioms. Despite presenting itself as presupposition-free, formal axiology turns out to depend on a number of unwarranted assumptions, which may be summarised as follows:
1/ Value is treated as something that can be multiplied, added, or equated with other values.
This presupposes a specific definition of value that is far from self-evident. If formal axiology purports to study the 'empty form of value as such', it is in fact built upon a particular definition of value that serves as the foundation for its axioms. That definition, however, is questionable, rooted as it is in the presuppositions of its authors and their time. Husserl, for instance, regarded axiology as a practical discipline—an assumption we have sought to challenge. The definition of value as a practical concept is therefore by no means self-evident.
2/ The chosen method for addressing the problem of values consists in deriving propositions from axioms.
This too is far from obvious. The foundational method for axiology—a discipline that seeks to determine value—could be entirely different and need not conform to established methodologies in other fields. Axiology may well have a method of its own.
Formal axiology projects, then, while representing a promising step in theorising values and breaking with traditional 'philosophies of values', simultaneously bring about their own dissolution as an independent discipline. What remains is only the structure of such a discipline—an insufficient framework, resembling the skeleton of a stillborn entity.
There is a curious paradox here: in seeking to establish itself as a discipline, axiology appears to forgo the very question of values.
In its various forms, axiological objectivism fails to provide a satisfactory answer. Whether it relies on implicit methods (such as the qualitative or empirical approach) or on more elaborate ones (such as intuitionism or formal axiology), it cannot resolve the axiological question.
The natural response for the axiologist may be to reverse this approach: rather than seeking value in external objects or in the world, it may be more fitting to 'turn inward' and look for value within ourselves—within the subject. This is axiological subjectivism, to which I now turn.
1. Ibid, section I, §19