Formal axiologies likely represent an advancement beyond intuitionism.
They at least recognise the existence of a problem of values and assume that a discipline specifically dedicated to addressing this problem is necessary.
Furthermore, by avoiding efforts to determine what is or is not valuable and focusing instead on identifying the formal laws underlying axiology, they show a foundation in a suspension (epoché) of value judgements, acknowledging that values remain unfounded.
However, formal axiologies are inherently limited by their own scope: they do not aim to reveal any truth about the content of axiology itself (i.e., what does or does not possess value) but merely seek to establish a formal framework within which axiology might operate.
Their epoché does not simply engage in a critical reevaluation of all values; it also extends to suspending the axiological question entirely.
Thus, as with intuitionism, the problem of values does not emerge here, as this approach excludes any reflection on the substantive content of value judgments. As Husserl himself notes: What is good cannot be decided formaliter, any more than what is true can be determined by formal logic alone, nor can one formaliter decide what is objectively best or practically required
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Therefore, following Brentano, we understand that the existence of a positive value X is itself a positive value, yet we cannot identify which specific X possesses positive value.
In summary, formal axiology can either retain its purely 'formal' character, which would make it incapable of resolving (or even posing) the problem of values, or one might attempt to deduce axiological content from these formal axioms. However, this seems impractical, as nothing within the observed axioms enables us to identify the X with a positive existence or whose value could complete that of Y.
On the other hand, formal axiologies, grounded in the act of epoché, strive to transcend all presuppositions; however, this aim does not seem to succeed.
Rather than conceptualising axiology as an autonomous discipline with its own distinctive methods and concepts, formal axiologies are modelled on mathematical or geometrical frameworks (or logic, in Husserl’s case), relying on deductively connected propositions derived from axioms. Despite presenting itself as presupposition-free, formal axiology appears to depend on unfounded assumptions, summarised as follows:
1/ Value is considered as something that can be multiplied, added, or equated with other values.
This assumes a specific definition of value, which is far from self-evident. If formal axiology intends to study the 'empty form of value as such', then it is fundamentally built on a particular definition of value that serves as the foundation for its axioms. However, this definition within formal axiologies is questionable, rooted in the presuppositions of its authors and their time. For instance, Husserl considered axiology a practical discipline (an idea we have tried to challenge). Therefore, the definition of value as a practical concept is not self-evident.
2/ The chosen method to address the problem of values involves deducing propositions from axioms.
Again, this approach is not obvious. The foundational method for axiology, which seeks to determine value, could be entirely different and may not align with known methodologies in other disciplines. Perhaps axiology has its own unique method?
Thus, formal axiology projects, while representing a promising step in theorising values and breaking from traditional 'philosophies of values', simultaneously mark their own dissolution as an independent discipline. Only the structure of this discipline remains—an insufficient framework, resembling the skeleton of a stillborn entity.
It is a curious paradox that axiology, in seeking to establish itself as a discipline, appears to forego the very question of values.
In its various forms, axiological objectivism fails to provide a satisfactory answer. Whether relying on implicit methods (e.g., qualitative or empirical) or more elaborate approaches (such as intuitionism or formal axiology), it cannot resolve the axiological question.
The natural response for the axiologist may be to reverse this approach: instead of seeking value in external objects or the world, it may be more fitting to 'turn inward' and search for value within ourselves, within the subject. This approach is axiological subjectivism, which I will now examine.
1. Ibid, section I, §19