Formal axiologies likely represent a progression beyond intuitionism.
They at least acknowledge the existence of a problem of values and assume that a discipline specifically designed to address this problem is necessary.
Additionally, by rejecting attempts to determine what is or is not valuable and focusing instead on identifying the formal laws underlying axiology, they demonstrate a foundation in an epoché of values, acknowledging that values remain unfounded.
However, formal axiologies are inherently limited by their own project: they do not purport to reveal any truth about the content of axiology itself (i.e., what does or does not possess value) but seek only to create a formal framework within which axiology might operate.
Their epoché does not merely engage in a critical reevaluation of all values; it extends to suspending the axiological question altogether.
Thus, as with intuitionism, the problem of values does not emerge, given that this project excludes any reflection on the substantive content of value judgments. Husserl himself agrees: What is good cannot be decided formaliter, any more than what is true can be determined by formal logic alone, nor can one formaliter decide what is objectively best or practically required
1.
Therefore, following Brentano, we know that the existence of a positive value X is itself a positive value, yet we can never identify which specific X possesses positive value.
In summary, formal axiology can either retain its 'formal' character, making it incapable of resolving (or even posing) the problem of values, or one might attempt to deduce axiological content from these formal axioms; however, this seems unfeasible, as nothing in the observed axioms enables us to identify the X with a positive existence or whose value could complement Y’s.
On the other hand, formal axiologies aim, through the act of epoché upon which they are based, to transcend all presuppositions; however, this does not appear to succeed.
Thus, instead of conceptualising axiology as an autonomous discipline with its own unique methods and concepts, formal axiologies are modelled on mathematical or geometrical frameworks (or logic, in Husserl’s case), relying on deductively connected propositions stemming from axioms. Despite presenting itself as free from suppositions, formal axiology appears to rely on unfounded presuppositions, summarised as follows:
1/ Value is considered something that can be multiplied, added, or equated with other values.
This presupposes a specific definition of value, which remains far from self-evident. If formal axiology wants to study the "empty form of value as such", then it is essentially based on a definition of value on which all these axioms are built. However, the definition of value within formal axiologies is questionable, rooted in the presuppositions of its authors and their time. For instance, Husserl viewed axiology as a practical discipline (an idea we have attempted to contest). The definition of value as a practical concept is therefore not self-evident.
2/ The chosen method to address the problem of values relies on deducing propositions from axioms.
Once again, it is not obvious. The foundational method for axiology, aimed at determining value, could differ entirely and may not align with any known methodologies in other disciplines. Perhaps axiology has its own unique method?
Thus, formal axiology projects appear to represent an especially promising step in the theorisation of values, breaking away from traditional 'philosophies of values' and marking the establishment of axiology as an independent discipline. Yet, this birth simultaneously marks its dissolution, as it is emptied of substantive content at the very moment of its inception. Only the framework of this discipline remains—an inadequate structure, resembling the skeleton of a stillborn entity.
It is a notable paradox that axiology established itself as a discipline by foregoing the very question of values.
Axiological objectivism, in its various forms, thus fails to provide a satisfactory answer. Whether it relies on implicit methods (e.g., qualitative or empirical) or on more elaborate approaches (such as intuitionism or formal axiology), it ultimately cannot resolve the axiological question.
The natural response for the axiologist may be to reverse this approach: rather than seeking value in external objects or the world, it might be more apt to 'turn inward' and search for value within ourselves, within the subject. This approach is axiological subjectivism, which I will now examine.
1. Ibid, section I, §19