B/ In the Subject?

1/ Definition and Presentation of the Two Types of Subjectivism

Axiological subjectivism can be defined as the doctrine asserting that value does not inherently belong to things (as objectivism would claim), but that humans attribute value to things. Based on this general definition, two types of subjectivism can be distinguished—radically so—depending on how we interpret the term ‘attribute’ in the phrase ‘humans attribute value to things'.

In the first type of subjectivism, ‘attribute’ implies that value, created by humans—or rather, arising from our desires—remains within us, constituting nothing more than a fiction or concept, with no bearing on the real world.
Here, ‘humans attribute value to things’ means that we project onto the world values that the world itself does not possess; these values are strictly human, meaningful only to us and relevant only within our context. We can label this axiological position simply subjectivism, as it asserts that values reside solely within subjectivity and lack any objectivity.

The second type of subjectivism is quite the opposite, and it may feel somewhat incongruous to group these two divergent positions under the same term. This second axiological position holds that humans attribute values to the world not merely by projection, but by genuinely creating them, so that the value becomes as real as the object to which it is attributed. Humans create value much like a sculptor creates a statue or a painter a painting; however, because this value, though real and objective, originates from us, it remains a form of subjectivism.
I propose labelling this second axiological position 'creative subjectivism' to distinguish it from the first, which we will call 'classical subjectivism' rather than 'sterile subjectivism', a term that seems overly negative and insufficiently fair to this doctrine.

I intend to examine this doctrine in both its aspects to better understand its meaning and legitimacy.

a) The Prehistory of Subjectivism: Protagoras

Viewed in this way, axiological subjectivism appears as a specific application in the field of values of Protagoras' famous phrase: Man is the measure of all things. Thus, this doctrine might be as old as its opposing perspective, objectivism, and it is reasonable to think it represents a way of perceiving the world that some people instinctively adopt, regardless of era; in other words, there may be no inherent priority given to objectivism.
We do not know precisely what Protagoras intended by saying 'man is the measure of all things'; perhaps he was not referring to any specific individual but rather to humanity as a species, which would imply a kind of speciesism.

However, our interest lies not in examining the ambiguities surrounding the birth of subjectivism, but in focusing on the period when subjectivism emerged forcefully as a coherent axiological doctrine—no longer just an enigmatic statement like Protagoras'—namely, the seventeenth century.