B/ In the Subject?

1/ Definition and Presentation of the Two Types of Subjectivism

Axiological subjectivism can be defined as the doctrine holding that value does not inherently belong to things (as objectivism would claim), but that human beings attribute value to them. On the basis of this general definition, two types of subjectivism can be distinguished—and distinguished radically—depending on how we interpret the word 'attribute' in the phrase 'human beings attribute value to things'.

In the first type of subjectivism, 'attribute' implies that value, created by human beings—or rather, arising from our desires—remains within us, amounting to nothing more than a fiction or concept, with no bearing on the real world.
Here, 'human beings attribute value to things' means that we project onto the world values that the world itself does not possess; these values are strictly human, meaningful only to us and relevant only within our own sphere. This axiological position may simply be called subjectivism, since it holds that values reside solely within subjectivity and are entirely lacking in objectivity.

The second type of subjectivism is quite the opposite, and it may seem somewhat incongruous to group these two divergent positions under the same label. This second axiological position holds that human beings attribute values to the world not merely by projection, but by genuinely creating them, so that the value becomes as real as the object to which it is attributed. Human beings create value much as a sculptor creates a statue or a painter a painting; yet because this value, though real and objective, originates from us, it remains a form of subjectivism.
I propose calling this second axiological position 'creative subjectivism' to distinguish it from the first, which we shall call 'classical subjectivism' rather than 'sterile subjectivism'—a label that seems unduly negative and insufficiently fair to the doctrine.

I intend to examine this doctrine in both its forms in order to better understand its meaning and legitimacy.

a) The Prehistory of Subjectivism: Protagoras

Seen in this light, axiological subjectivism appears as a specific application, in the field of values, of Protagoras' famous dictum: Man is the measure of all things. This doctrine may therefore be as old as its opposing perspective, objectivism, and it is reasonable to suppose that it represents a way of perceiving the world that some people instinctively adopt regardless of era; in other words, there may be no inherent priority accorded to objectivism.
We do not know precisely what Protagoras intended by the phrase 'man is the measure of all things'; perhaps he was referring not to any specific individual but to humanity as a species, which would carry a certain speciesist implication.

Our interest, however, lies not in examining the ambiguities surrounding the birth of subjectivism, but in focusing on the period when subjectivism emerged forcefully as a coherent axiological doctrine—no longer merely an enigmatic utterance like that of Protagoras—namely, the seventeenth century.