c) Spinozist radicalisation

If Hobbes represents the infancy of axiological subjectivism, Spinoza might be seen as its maturation—provided we equate radicalisation with maturation. Spinoza appears to radicalise Hobbes’ intuitions, carrying them to their logical conclusion.

This radicalisation is evident in Spinoza’s famous proposition in the Ethics: In no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it ¹.

Hobbes had already advanced a similar idea: Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil ².
However, Hobbes also proposed that a man’s desire for something is sparked by the pleasure it can offer him. For Hobbes, pleasure—not desire—is primary. Moreover, pleasure is linked to the nature of the object: some objects are inherently pleasurable, while others are inherently unpleasant, depending on their capacity to promote or hinder our vital movement. Thus, our desires and aversions, despite their subjectivity, are tied to a certain degree of objectivity.

With Spinoza, by contrast, desire precedes all else, leading us to project qualities—'good,' 'bad,' 'pleasant,' or 'unpleasant'—onto the object: I desire something; therefore, I perceive it as pleasant. Here, the object seems to play little role beyond serving as a neutral receptacle for one’s projections. To grasp the opposition between the two philosophers, we can compare Spinoza’s proposition with Hobbes’ statement: Every man for his own part, calls that which pleases, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeases him ³.

If we translate this moral thesis into axiological terms—given that Spinoza seems to express axiological intent through moral concepts—we might interpret him as claiming that it is not the value of a thing that arouses our desire but desire that creates value.

Spinoza’s classical subjectivism is no more creative than Hobbes’. In other words, human beings mistakenly project qualities onto the world that it does not inherently possess; they do not create these qualities. Thus good and evil do not exist in Nature ⁴. Consequently, any moral judgement lacks meaning: To moralize is to misunderstand ⁵.

A. Comte-Sponville observes the distinction in Spinoza’s treatment of truth versus morality (or value): There is no morality, from God’s point of view, but neither is there humanity without morality. There is necessarily a gap here between theory and practice. A true idea, insofar as it is true, is the same in me and in God; a value, however, is not' (Ethics, I, appendix). Thus, all truth is absolute, whereas all value is relative (II, 11, corollary and 32-34) ⁶.

This radicalisation seems to confer axiological subjectivism with its fullest meaning, placing it in direct opposition to objectivism—a stance we identify in Spinoza’s work. For this reason, we can view the Spinozist moment as the maturation of classical subjectivism.

1. Ethics, III, 9, note
2. Leviathan, I, VI
3. Hobbes, Human Nature, chap. VII
4. Short Treatise, I, 10 and II, 4
5. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical philosophy
6. Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale, « Spinoza » article