b) Creative subjectivism, as a second, disguised form of nihilism

On the surface, Nietzsche’s project appears to centre on a struggle against nihilism.
He rejects Christianity, Buddhism, and the teachings of his mentor Schopenhauer, viewing them as veiled expressions of nihilism.
Consequently, he envisions the superhuman—the ideal evolutionary stage towards which humanity must strive—as the figure who ultimately triumphs over nihilism: This man of the future, who in this wise will redeem us from the old ideal, as he will from that ideal's necessary corollary of great nausea, will to nothingness, and Nihilism; this tocsin of noon and of the great verdict, which renders the will again free, who gives back to the world its goal and to man his hope, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this conqueror of God and of Nothingness — he must one day come ¹.

How might Nietzschean thought function as an antidote to nihilism? Or, more specifically, how might creative subjectivism counter nihilism?
This approach can be summarised as follows: creative subjectivism seeks to transcend nihilism by first acknowledging it—accepting nihilism’s claim that things lack intrinsic value—and then 'solving the problem' by introducing a source of value. Far from being devoid of meaning, the world is filled with values, as it contains the source from which values arise: the human being, the subject, as the creator of values.
Thus, the world is not devoid of value, as nihilism asserts, but instead lacks values that 'subsist in themselves' or 'in things.' Rather, the world is replete with the values we attribute to things.
Nietzsche’s meaning in this context has already been explored.

We must now consider whether creative subjectivism provides a compelling response to the profound challenge of nihilism.

First, we must examine the nature of the value humans create. Is it real or merely illusory? Put differently, is it objective or subjective? It must be objective, for if it were subjective, we would remain within the framework of classical subjectivism, which maintains that human desire generates only fictitious values mistakenly projected onto the world.

This raises a question that Nietzsche himself appears not to address: how is this possible? How can humans create real value?
Nietzsche seems to assume that humans have the capacity to create values and attribute them to things. This assumption may appear self-evident when referring to 'subjective' value—the value humans assign to their ideas about things, as these ideas are self-constructed. However, when speaking of 'real' value, we imply that things in the external world themselves receive value from humans. How, then, can such a phenomenon occur?

Do we, in an absurd hypothetical scenario, believe that by merely standing before an object and concentrating, a value will somehow emerge from our mind, travel through the air, and become embodied within the object? This notion of ‘donating’ values belongs to the realm of magical thinking—the tendency, often observed in children or in superstitious eras, to believe that merely thinking intently about something can make it real. In other words, this mode of thinking mistakes dreams for reality.

Thus, we must ask whether it is even possible to ‘gift’ value—a question Nietzsche himself appears not to confront.

Even if we assume this ‘gift’ of value is possible—allowing creative subjectivism to function as a coherent axiological doctrine—it still cannot oppose nihilism. The reason is straightforward: it does not contradict nihilism.

Creative subjectivism, in fact, incorporates nihilism by conceding that things lack intrinsic value. If humans are responsible for assigning value, then the world itself is devoid of intrinsic worth—precisely as nihilism asserts. If the things we love possessed intrinsic value, there would be no need to project value onto them. Thus, the very concept of projecting values inherently assumes that 'nothing has value in itself'.
The only way to challenge nihilism is to refute its core claim by demonstrating that the world possesses intrinsic value. By incorporating nihilism, subjectivism imagines itself as transcending nihilism. Yet, it instead reinforces nihilism, granting it a privileged place as the premise—or even the foundation—of its entire framework. Nihilism, embedded like a worm within creative subjectivism, would then become unassailable by it; by building upon nihilism as its foundation, subjectivism would ultimately ensure its own collapse.

1. On the Genealogy of morals, 2nd treatise, 21