A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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e/ Is subjectivism a consistent doctrine in each of its two forms?

Classical subjectivism is not anthropocentric: it strips the universe of all value, rendering it nihilistic and positioning humanity as the repository of these values. However, since these values are fictitious and do not grant humanity the power to bestow them upon the world, true anthropocentrism is absent.

Similarly, creative subjectivism, by stripping the universe of all values, constitutes a form of nihilism. However, creative subjectivism positions humanity as the creator of all value, granting it this power. Thus, its nihilism transitions, in a second phase, into an anthropocentrism—defined as 'Nothing has value except humanity'—or even an egocentrism: 'Nothing has value except myself', if each individual is seen as assigning value to whatever they choose.

Creative subjectivism, therefore, constitutes a consistent doctrine: as it encompasses two stages, it cannot be reduced to either simple nihilism or simple anthropocentrism. Indeed, it represents an original synthesis of nihilism and anthropocentrism through its theory of value creation.
We could, therefore, accept it as a tenable axiological position, given its consistency (and despite any suggestion of excessive pride, since rejecting it on this basis would contradict our epoché of values). Yet we may dismiss it outright, as it rests on the impossible and incoherent concept of value donation.

As we have established, donating values is impossible; the only plausible interpretation of this expression is that a person may consider a particular thing to hold value, which is entirely distinct from the concept of value donation as envisioned by this doctrine.
Subjectivism, therefore, appears to fail either due to a lack of internal consistency or because it is fundamentally impossible.


f) Final remark about a new characteristic of nihilism

Our reflections may now allow us to answer a question raised earlier in our exploration of nihilism’s meaning 1: what practical behaviour can the nihilist adopt? Since the nihilist asserts that nothing has value, it would seem he cannot choose any particular mode of action: he cannot end his life, succumb to sadness, resign himself to suffering, or even experience joy, as each would imply assigning some value to that behaviour. The answer is now evident: classical subjectivism, as a concealed form of nihilism, permits all forms of behaviour—sadness, disappointment, joy, and serenity. Yet we always add: 'Everything is relative'!
In other words, the nihilist can experience happiness but will always recognise that there is no justification for it. He may adopt any attitude he prefers, provided he acknowledges that he could just as easily have chosen to act differently. He can 'take pleasure in the world' while simultaneously acknowledging that the world itself is devoid of value.

If the world is devoid of value, the gaze turns inward, and the wise person can only find enjoyment within themselves. It is not the perfection of the world they enjoy but rather their own—relative and subjective—perfection.
Thus, one can be a nihilist and still find happiness—a 'happy nihilist'; all that is required is an acknowledgement that everything contributing to happiness holds no intrinsic value.

The time has come to summarise the main findings of our analysis and to address the question: 'Where do we look for value?'


1. Book II, I, B, 1