e/ Is Subjectivism a Consistent Doctrine in Each of Its Two Forms?
Classical subjectivism is not anthropocentric: it strips the universe of all value, rendering it nihilistic, and positions humanity as the repository of these values. However, since these values are fictitious and do not grant humanity the power to bestow them upon the world, genuine anthropocentrism is absent.
Creative subjectivism likewise strips the universe of all values and thus constitutes a form of nihilism. It does, however, position humanity as the creator of all value, granting it this power. Its nihilism therefore transitions, in a second phase, into an anthropocentrism—defined as 'Nothing has value except humanity'—or even an egocentrism: 'Nothing has value except myself', if each individual is seen as assigning value to whatever they choose.
Creative subjectivism thus constitutes a consistent doctrine: since it encompasses two stages, it cannot be reduced to either simple nihilism or simple anthropocentrism. It represents, rather, an original synthesis of nihilism and anthropocentrism through its theory of value creation.
We might, therefore, accept it as a tenable axiological position on grounds of its consistency (and despite any suggestion of excessive pride, since rejecting it on that basis would contradict our epoché of values). Yet we may equally dismiss it outright, since it rests on the impossible and incoherent concept of value donation.
As we have established, donating values is impossible; the only plausible interpretation of this expression is that a person may regard a particular thing as holding value—which is an altogether different matter from value donation as envisioned by this doctrine.
Subjectivism therefore appears to fail either for want of internal consistency or because it is fundamentally impossible.
f) Final Remark on a New Characteristic of Nihilism
Our reflections may now allow us to answer a question raised earlier in our exploration of nihilism's meaning 1: what practical behaviour can the nihilist adopt? Since the nihilist asserts that nothing has value, it would seem he cannot choose any particular mode of action: he cannot end his life, succumb to sadness, resign himself to suffering, or even experience joy, since each would imply assigning some value to that behaviour. The answer is now clear: classical subjectivism, as a concealed form of nihilism, permits all forms of behaviour—sadness, disappointment, joy, and serenity. The one proviso is that we always add: 'Everything is relative'!
In other words, the nihilist can experience happiness but will always acknowledge that there is no justification for it. He may adopt whatever attitude he prefers, provided he recognises that he could just as easily have chosen to act differently. He can 'take pleasure in the world' while simultaneously acknowledging that the world itself is devoid of value.
If the world is devoid of value, the gaze turns inward, and the wise person can find enjoyment only within themselves. It is not the perfection of the world they enjoy but their own—relative and subjective—perfection.
One can thus be a nihilist and still find happiness—a 'happy nihilist'; all that is required is an acknowledgement that everything contributing to that happiness holds no intrinsic value.
The time has come to summarise the principal findings of our analysis and to address the question: 'Where do we look for value?'
1. Book II, I, B, 1