2/ Critical Examination of Subjectivism

a) Classical Subjectivism as a Disguised Form of Nihilism

The core idea of subjectivism holds that things lack inherent value, with value instead assigned by human beings, either as a projection or a creation. But have we not encountered the principle that 'things have no inherent value' before? Is this not the central tenet of axiological nihilism?
This points to a profound connection between subjectivism and nihilism—or, more precisely, to the fact that nihilism forms the foundation of subjectivism. We must now consider whether subjectivism, in reaching its conclusions, can transcend the nihilism inherent in its origins. This enquiry will focus on the two distinct forms of subjectivism we have identified: classical and creative.

Classical subjectivism seems incapable of transcending nihilism. Since concepts such as value, good and evil, and perfection exist solely as subjective projections, classical subjectivism effectively 'empties' the world of intrinsic value—mirroring the very essence of nihilism.

From our analysis of Hobbes's subjectivism, we may draw a broader conclusion about classical subjectivism as a whole. This raises a crucial question: can subjectivism counter nihilism? Can it provide a response or an alternative?

This seems unlikely. In subjectivism, values remain confined to the mind, while the external world remains as devoid of real, objective value as nihilism asserts. Subjectivism ultimately concedes nihilism's central claim: that no real, objective value exists. Objective reality is the sole domain of the nihilist, the only ground from which he makes his assertions. What the subjectivist adds about values within people's ideas neither concerns nor interests the nihilist and does nothing to challenge his position.

We can now see that the subjectivist is not genuinely opposed to the nihilist, since he is addressing a different domain: the mind rather than the world. In fact, subjectivism incorporates nihilism—even as it claims to transcend it—by conceding that real values neither exist in the objective world nor reside within things themselves. Subjectivism is therefore a form of nihilism.

Furthermore, since subjectivism does not present itself as such to the subjectivist, it becomes a hidden, unconscious form of nihilism—one that carries nihilism to its fullest expression. What is concealed can silently influence that which it inhabits, leaving its authority unchallenged. Thus, if our age is indeed subjectivist, as some contend (though we have observed that this seems unlikely, given that our post-contemporary age lacks any defining horizon), then, as an unconscious form of nihilism, subjectivism would ensure that nihilism effectively governs our time. It would thereby enable the complete triumph of nihilism, promoting it as the defining spirit of the age while concealing this reality—and so preventing us from recognising the tragedy of our time.

In demonstrating that subjectivism reduces to nihilism, I do not claim to have established its falsity.
To do so would imply that I had also established nihilism as false. On the contrary, I regard nihilism as a coherent—and even intriguing—axiological doctrine. In keeping with the proposed epoché of values, nihilism is not presumed to be inherently false; rather, its truth remains to be examined, as with all axiological doctrines.
What I have sought to show is that subjectivism is not an independent doctrine: a concept can only achieve coherence if it is distinct from others, its meaning arising from its uniqueness. Subjectivism, however, is merely a veiled form of nihilism. I therefore propose a simplification of our inquiry: we need not examine two distinct doctrines, subjectivism and nihilism. Determining the truth or falsity of nihilism would, in effect, resolve the question of subjectivism as well.

To put it another way: I have not sought to demonstrate that subjectivism is false, but rather that it lacks coherence as a doctrine with a distinct and independent meaning.

This inference—from subjectivism to nihilism—may, however, apply solely to classical subjectivism. Might creative subjectivism, which holds that human beings do not merely project fictitious values but genuinely create real ones, provide a meaningful response to nihilism? The strongest reason for entertaining this possibility lies with its principal theorist, Nietzsche, who appears to have consistently opposed nihilism. We must therefore re-examine subjectivism to determine whether, in this new form, it might be accepted as a coherent doctrine.