e) Contemporary Subjectivism

In the twentieth century, subjectivism saw a revival in both its classical and creative forms. Given the scope of this discussion, I will concentrate on the two principal doctrines that contributed to this resurgence.

Human beings are defined by freedom, which, for Sartre, appears incompatible with the existence of value as an inherent quality of the world—though paradoxically, freedom remains compatible with facticity, the existence of things available for use. Thus, value is revealed only to an active freedom, which brings value into existence simply by recognising it as such. Consequently, my freedom becomes the sole foundation of values, and nothing—absolutely nothing—justifies my choice of any particular value or scale of values ¹.

A resurgence of classical subjectivism can also be found in Ayer and Anderson's emotivist critique of moral notions. On their view, moral concepts lack cognitive meaning; they do not attribute objective qualities but merely express subjective feelings such as disgust or admiration. A statement like 'this is bad', for instance, carries no deeper meaning than exclamations such as 'Yuck!' or 'Ugh!' This doctrine—influenced, perhaps unintentionally, by the early Wittgenstein (and before him by Carnap), who denied any meaning to moral concepts—echoes classical subjectivism's claim that qualities are merely subjective notions erroneously projected onto the objective world.

This subjectivism resurfaces, finally, in numerous contemporary authors who employ a variety of arguments in its support.
Following Spinoza, desire is frequently regarded as the primary source of value's subjectivity: If the value of things resides in their capacity to provoke desire and is proportional to the intensity of that desire, then value must be considered essentially subjective ².
This perspective leads a Spinozist such as Misrahi to define evaluation from a subjectivist standpoint—as the act by which we 'calculate' and determine the value of an object or action. This act appears to presuppose the objectivity of the criteria—that is, the values by which we measure and assess the worth of a person or action. However, in reality, evaluation is primarily the act by which consciousness establishes values: it invents and defines goals deemed worthy of pursuit and recommends them to others for action. This creation of values forms the foundational act that enables empirical evaluation, positioning creative evaluation as the origin of ethics ³.

Ruyer, for his part, supports the view that value is necessarily subjective, on the grounds that evaluation is inherently performed by a subject. He writes: In describing value, one cannot disregard the presence of an agent or subject, except by means of a provisional fiction. In this sense, value is subjective: an ideal is always the ideal of a subject, and the value or form of a precious object is perceived by a subject. Indeed, we cannot conceive of what would be funny, graceful, or useful in a world devoid of subjects and subjectivity ⁴. Drawing an analogy with secondary qualities such as colour, Ruyer seeks to show that values retain some connection to objectivity.

A detailed exploration of the many forms of contemporary subjectivism lies beyond the scope of this discussion. At this stage, however, we have arrived at a sufficiently precise understanding of subjectivism—in the two forms we have identified—to proceed with assessing its legitimacy. Can subjectivism fully satisfy us? Does it offer an axiological solution to the problem of values?

1. Being and Nothingness, 1st part
2. Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie, Leipzig, 1897 and Ribot, Logic of feelings
3. Qu'est-ce que l'éthique ? Armand Colin, Paris, 1997, Glossaire analytique, « Evaluation », p.242
4. Philosophie de la valeur