b) Hobbes' Subjectivism

Hobbes presents subjectivism in a particularly elaborate form, embedding it within a complex argumentative framework.
He draws on the ancient corpuscular materialism that inspired Democritus to declare: By convention sweet is sweet, bitter is bitter, hot is hot, cold is cold, color is color; but in truth there are only atoms and the void.

Hobbes introduces another fundamental element into the realm of truly real entities: movement, including its various manifestations within us, such as desire.

In Human Nature, Hobbes likewise dismisses as subjective fictions everything that is not composed of atoms or movements but instead represents sensory interpretations of these—such as colour, sound, and touch. It is worth noting that this occurs well before Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, a concept also explored by Descartes around the same period, albeit without using the exact term.
Colour, for instance, is simply the effect of atomic movement or arrangement upon the eye and is therefore subjective rather than inherently real.
Similarly, Hobbes excludes sounds from objective reality, as illustrated by his example of a ringing bell: The clapper has no sound in it, but motion, and makes motion in the internal parts of the bell; so the bell has motion, and not sound, that imparts motion to the air; and the air has motion, but not sound; the air imparts motion by the ear and nerve unto the brain; and the brain has motion but not sound; from the brain, it rebounds back into the nerves outward, and thence it becomes an apparition without, which we call sound ¹.

This leads Hobbes to 'empty' the world of all perceived qualities, since as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not in the object, but in the sentient. And from hence also it follows, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they be not there, but are seeming and apparitions only: the things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused ².

By contrast, Hobbes affirms the reality of desire, characterising it as a form of movement that directly affects us. He explains the mechanism as follows: we are constantly influenced by what he terms 'vital movement'. Any perception or sensation of an object constitutes a movement that either enhances or impedes this vital force, producing pleasure or pain, which in turn generates desire or aversion: Motion [of perceived thing] not stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder the motion which is called vital; when it helps, it is called delight, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head: and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful ³.

Hobbes draws out the profound moral implications of this principle: each individual labels as good or evil what they desire or detest—what brings pleasure or inflicts pain. As a result, good and evil are no more objectively real than colours or sounds; they are merely subjective fictions. Only the movements of desire or aversion possess objective reality.

Consequently, each individual perceives what they desire or despise as good or evil, and no conception of good or evil carries greater weight than any other: While every man differs from another in constitution, they differ also from one another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us ⁴.

In this way, Hobbes strips the concepts of good and evil of their universal meaning. First, he equates their determinate content with desire and aversion. Second, he renders good and evil relative to each individual's preferences: each person identifies as good what pleases them, which may differ from another's judgement. Yet universality seems intrinsic to the very concepts of good and evil. While Hobbes does not eliminate their meaning entirely, he deprives them of objectivity, thereby transforming their significance.

This move extends beyond the concepts of good and evil: according to Hobbes, all qualities lose their objectivity. In Leviathan, he generalises this notion further, contending that pulchrum and turpe—which he associates with the English concepts of 'right' and 'wrong'—represent all qualities as inherently subjective in nature: For pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable: and for turpe; foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mine, or countenance, that promises good and evil ⁵.

Since value has traditionally been conceptualised through quality and morality, it seems reasonable to infer that Hobbes regards value as subjective. We would suggest that axiological subjectivism underpins his moral subjectivism, and his extension of subjectivity to all qualities lends further support to this interpretation.

In Hobbes, we encounter the first systematic articulation of axiological subjectivism, embedded within a complex and compelling argumentative framework. It is for this reason that I regard Hobbes as the originator of subjectivism.

1. Human Nature, chap. II
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., chap. VII
4. Ibid.
5. Leviathan, I, 6