This concept can be better understood by examining Kantian doctrine, where—perhaps surprisingly—this anthropocentrism rooted in subjectivism comes to light.

Kant asserts that nothing is an end in itself except the rational being, who must therefore be regarded not merely as a means but also as an end (the second formulation of his categorical imperative): Man—and in general every rational being—exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion ¹.

Everything else—meaning all things other than humanity and, potentially, other rational beings (such as angels?)—serves merely as a means. Given the relationship Kant draws between value and ends, this implies that only humanity possesses absolute value, whereas other beings and things have merely conditional, relative value. Relative to what? To humanity, regarded as the centre of the universe: The value of any objects to be obtained through our actions is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature, if they are not rational beings, have only relative value as means, and are therefore called 'things' [Sachen]; whereas rational beings are called 'persons', because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves (i.e. as not to be used merely as means) ².

Kant thus advances this unprecedented proposition: only humanity has value: [Persons] are objective ends, i.e. things [Dinge] whose existence is an end in itself. It is indeed an irreplaceable end: you can't substitute for it something else to which it would be merely a means. If there were no such ends in themselves, nothing of absolute value could be found ³.

Remarkably, Kant appears to employ a classically subjectivist argument—specifically a Hobbesian one—in support of this idea: value is not inherent in the world but is generated by human desire: All of the ends—material ends—that a rational being voluntarily sets before himself as things to be achieved through his conduct are merely relative, for their value comes solely from how they relate to the particular way in which the subject's faculty of desire is constituted ⁴.
Or again: Things that are preferred have only conditional value, for if the preferences (and the needs arising from them) didn't exist, their object would be worthless ⁵.

In other words, a thing has value only because it is desired; when it is no longer desired, it loses all value. Kant thus appears to adopt a subjectivist position here. Whether he can ultimately be considered a subjectivist depends on the weight attributed to this passage.
If one takes it to represent Kant's fundamental position on values—underpinning his entire theory of ends and duties—then it could be argued that the Kantian system rests at bottom on a latent subjectivism. If, on the other hand, one holds that for Kant the concepts of ends and duties are primary, and his reflections on value secondary and less significant, one might conclude that the Kantian system is essentially a formalist objectivism, albeit one that inexplicably incorporates certain subjectivist elements.

What does emerge clearly, however, is the unprecedented anthropocentrism of creative subjectivism, which strips the universe of inherent values, ascribes them to humanity, and grants humanity the power to assign them as it sees fit: One claims to call into question values, reverse or transmute them; in fact, one claims to create values, since the promethean subjectivity of man is considered to have an ability which, up to now, was attributed only to God: the creation from nothingness ⁶.

It is worth noting that the critique of subjectivism as both anthropocentrism and nihilism appears earlier in Hegel, albeit in a different context: for Hegel, it takes the form of a condemnation of Fichtean idealism—specifically Fichte's subjective, as opposed to absolute, idealism. We shall examine how his critique aligns with ours.

1. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd section, 58
2. Ibid., 59
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 58
5. Ibid., 59
6. J.J. Goux, Où vont les valeurs ?