4/ A critical look at subjectivism and eclecticism

Nihilism, in proclaiming that nothing has value, expresses explicit contempt. Conversely, creative subjectivism and eclecticism present themselves as two ostensibly authentic forms of love.
Subjectivism, by asserting that humanity imparts value to things, appears to propose an idealised concept of love, in which the lover gives the beloved not only love but also intrinsic value. The lover cannot offer a more complete gift to the beloved, which is why true love, it seems, can only be conceived through the lens of subjectivism in values.
Eclecticism universalises love, suggesting that if everything holds value, humanity’s logical response must be to become a universal lover in a world where all things are deemed worthy of affection.

Thus, eclecticism and subjectivism appear to share a common ambition: to embody pure love by extending it to its farthest conceivable reach.

We will now examine this ambition, guided by the insights we have offered into the concept of love. Might these so-called doctrines of love, in fact, arise from a concealed contempt?

If we explicitly describe the nature of the subjectivist’s relationship to things—particularly those he claims to love—it might sound like this: 'You have no value on your own; you need me to have one. I am the source of your value'. 'Without me, you would have no value'. It is clear what kind of 'love' could emerge from such foundations. In reality, subjectivism is merely disguised contempt for what it professes to love, as noted earlier when I suggested it reduces to a form of nihilism.

Eclecticism does not violate this essential condition; rather, it amplifies it by asserting that everything possesses inherent value. However, as we will demonstrate, it violates two other principles of love.

If we claim that 'everything is of great value', the necessary consequence is that nothing stands superior to anything else; the loved object holds no unique place, and there is no hierarchy: everything is equally valued. The eclectic, then, is someone who, perhaps unknowingly, tells each thing he loves: 'I love you, but you are common', or 'I love you, but there are thousands like you'. He is not truly a loving being but a contemptuous one.

Conversely, to love justice inherently implies hating injustice; indeed, to love justice is to hate injustice. Similarly, to love peace is to reject violence. The loved object itself—whether justice or peace—demands this of us. The eclectic, who claims to love both justice and injustice and even justifies evil, fails to grasp the essence of what he loves. Thus, he cannot truly love, for to love something is to embrace its essence—something he fails to understand. Genuine love, therefore, is impossible for him. The eclectic is a kind of 'deaf' lover; he disregards the true nature of what he loves—an attitude akin to contempt.

Here, we may have uncovered a new essential condition of love: to love something is to value what aligns with it—or, at the very least, what is compatible with it.

Subjectivism and eclecticism share a fundamental flaw: their failure to achieve their initial aim of presenting themselves as genuine forms of love. This failure appears to invalidate these doctrines or, at the very least, reduce them to a consistent alternative: nihilism.

The failure of these doctrines to recognise their shortcomings likely stems from an unawareness that they are, in reality, built upon a flawed theory of love’s nature.
In essence, asking 'Is axiological subjectivism possible?' is equivalent to asking, 'Is love merely a subjective feeling of pleasure?'
As long as we answer affirmatively without recognising love’s cognitive aspect—that is, without understanding that certain judgements or conditions are inherent to love—we risk violating these conditions unknowingly and thereby falling into nihilism.

In this discussion, I have proposed a particular theory on the nature of love. What, then, does this theory contribute to our earlier reflections on values and the nature of axiology? Can it truly assist us, for instance, in addressing the crucial question of the method that axiology should adopt to determine a thing's value?
I now propose to examine the connection between this theory of love and our reflections on axiology's methodological approach.

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