A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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If we now accept that love is the feeling that envelops the attribution of a value to something, something very troubling emerges: we seem to have just uncovered something that we do not know what to call (a condition of love? a law of love?): "To love something, you have to attribute a real value to it" or again: "Do you want to love this thing? Attribute a value to it".
This kind of imperative, not hypothetical or categorical, but "erotic" (!), in the sense that it comes from Eros, puzzles us because we do not know what status to give it.

First of all, we do not know if it is really an imperative. The inference is of the following form: "X is Y. So for there to be X, there must be Y". Here, the verb "must" does not imply any consideration of law, but simply of fact. It is used in the same way as a strange proposition like "Man is rational. Therefore man must be rational". In fact, it does not seem to be an imperative at all, but a reformulation in fallaciously imperative terms of a fact, or of a proposition of essence.

Secondly, this idea that "in order to love, we must assign a value" does not appear to be a law that comes from an external sphere, that of the legal right, and descends on love and governs it. It seems to be a necessity that arises from love itself, so that it can take place, which is quite different.
In fact, we are not dealing here with a moral imperative that claims to "discipline" love, by resorting to the notion of right or duty, in short, we are not dealing here with a "law of love". We are dealing with an absolutely necessary condition for the concept of love to have any meaning. From the moment that a content of meaning= Y is part of the meaning of X, it is necessary (this is the kind of necessity we are trying to think of) for Y to be for X to be: since love is the attribution of a value to the object loved, it is necessary to attribute a value to the object we claim to love for it to be true love.

Finally, this is not a real hypothetical imperative, which determines which means must necessarily be chosen to achieve a given end, because here it is not a means-ends relationship that exists between the attribution of value and love, but an identity of essence: we do not attribute a value in order to love, but to attribute a value is to love.