3/ Criticism of the Confusion of Love with Desire

In my view, love differs from desire in one essential respect: it attributes value to the object of love (I say 'attributes', not 'creates'), whereas desire does nothing of the sort. Put simply, desire attributes no intrinsic value—at most, a relative one—to its object, whereas love fundamentally affirms the inherent value of the beloved.

A few concrete examples may help clarify this distinction. I might look at an apple pie with eyes gleaming with desire—I want it, but I do not love it. It would be absurd to claim I have a loving relationship with this pie. Why? Because I do not value it; I do not assign it a significant place in the hierarchy of beings. Yet I may still feel an intense desire for it.
Similarly, a man may desire a woman without feeling any love for her (and vice versa): he is attracted to her but does not attribute any inherent value to her. Conversely, one can conceive of a man loving a woman without feeling the slightest desire for her—is this not what we call 'platonic love'?

Desire and love are thus two distinct and irreducible concepts, the key difference lying in whether value is attributed to the object of these feelings.
Desire need not attribute value to its object, since it functions as a dynamic force that sustains and reinforces itself through its own activity. Desire does not require the object in hand; indeed, attaining it often extinguishes desire: I do not need a steak to feel hunger, but receiving a piece of meat is precisely what will satisfy it.
Love, by contrast, arises only when an object appears and captures its interest. It is not extinguished by the possession of the object; rather, it finds its fullest expression there. I take pleasure in the presence and thought of the loved one, wishing to prolong—even to perpetuate—that moment. By contrast, when I am fulfilled culinarily or sexually, the thought of returning to the person or thing may quickly become unappealing, or even unbearable.

If this holds true, love and desire can be distinguished by their relationship to value. Metaphorically, love might be described as objectivist, whereas desire is subjectivist.

As we have seen, subjectivism reduces love to desire and places considerable importance on desire—an approach that is not without insight. Subjectivism does not necessarily deny value to the desired object; rather, when it does attribute value, it immediately asserts that this value does not reside in the object but is created by the subject. This may seem plausible, given that the dynamism of desire can lend it a certain force. Our analysis of subjectivism ¹, however, points to the impossibility of any such creation.

Equating 'having value' with 'being desirable' thus typically leads to a subjectivist perspective: If the value of things lies in their ability to provoke desires, and value is proportional to the strength of desire, then value must be regarded as essentially subjective ².

It is easy to see how, following Misrahi, one might equate 'valuable' with 'desirable': Value marks the desirability of an object or act, meaning the intensity of desire that makes it worthy of being desired and proposed for action by others ³.
This perspective leads, by the same logic, to creative subjectivism: Evaluation... seems to presuppose the objectivity of criteria—that is, the values enabling us to measure and judge a person or action. In reality, however, evaluation is primarily the act by which consciousness establishes values, inventing and defining goals deemed worthy of pursuit and worthy of proposing to others ⁴.

In sum, I hold that it is sufficient to demonstrate that desire and love are irreducible to each other: desire is bound up with the subjectification of value, whereas love implies an affirmation of real value in its object. This latter idea warrants further exploration as we consider its implications.

1. Chapter III, I, B
2. Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie, Leipzig, 1897 and Ribot, Logique des sentiments
3. Qu’est-ce que l’éthique ? Armand Colin, Paris, 1997, Glossaire analytique, « Valeur », p. 267
4. Ibid., Glossaire analytique, « Evaluation », p. 242