3/ Criticism of the confusion of love with desire

In my view, love differs from desire in one essential respect: it attributes value to the object of love (I say it attributes, not creates), whereas desire does nothing of the sort. Put simply, desire attributes no intrinsic value—at most, a relative one—to its object, whereas love fundamentally affirms the inherent value of the beloved.

A few concrete examples may help clarify this distinction: I might look at an apple pie with eyes gleaming with desire—I want it, but I do not love it. It would be absurd to claim I have a loving relationship with this pie. Why? Because I do not value it; I do not assign it a significant place in the hierarchy of beings. Yet, I may still feel an intense desire for it.
Similarly, a man may desire a woman without feeling any love for her (and vice versa); he is attracted to her (or she to him) but does not attribute any inherent value to her. Conversely, one might conceive of a man loving a woman without the slightest desire for her—is this not what we call 'platonic love'?

Thus, we can observe that desire and love are two distinct and irreducible concepts, with the key difference lying in whether value is attributed to the object of these feelings.
Desire does not need to attribute value to its object, as it functions as a dynamic force, sustaining and reinforcing itself through its own activity. Desire does not require the object, and indeed, attaining the object often suppresses desire: I do not need a steak to feel hunger, but receiving a piece of meat is precisely what will satisfy it.
Love, by contrast, arises only when an object appears and captures its interest. It is not extinguished by the possession of the object; rather, it finds its fullest expression there. I take pleasure in the presence and thought of the loved one, desiring to prolong, even eternalise, this moment. By contrast, when I am fulfilled either culinarily or sexually, the thought of repeating the activity—of returning to the person or thing—becomes unappealing, and may even grow unbearable.

If this holds true, then love and desire can be distinguished by their relationship to value. Metaphorically, love could be described as objectivist, whereas desire is subjectivist.

As we have observed, subjectivism reduces love to desire and places considerable importance on desire—an approach that reveals a significant insight. Subjectivism does not necessarily deny value to the desired object; rather, when it attributes value, it immediately asserts that this value does not reside in the object but is created by the subject. This perspective might seem plausible, given that the dynamism of desire can imbue it with power. However, our analysis of subjectivism ¹ suggests the impossibility of such creation.

Thus, equating 'having value' with 'being desirable' typically leads to a subjectivist perspective: If the value of things lies in their ability to provoke desires, and value is proportional to the strength of desire, then value must be regarded as essentially subjective ².

It is, therefore, easy to understand how, like Misrahi, we might equate ‘valuable’ with ‘desirable’: Value marks the desirability of an object or act, meaning the intensity of desire that makes it worthy of being desired and proposed for action by others ³.
Similarly, this perspective leads to creative subjectivism: Evaluation... seems to presuppose the objectivity of criteria—that is, the values enabling us to measure and judge a person or action. In reality, however, evaluation is primarily the act by which consciousness establishes values, inventing and defining goals deemed worthy of pursuit and worthy of proposing to others ⁴.

In summary, I believe it is sufficient to demonstrate that desire and love are irreducible to each other: desire is tied to the subjectification of value, whereas love implies an affirmation of real value in its object. This latter idea warrants further exploration as we examine its implications.

1. Chapter III, I, B
2. Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie, Leipzig, 1897 and Ribot, Logique des sentiments
3. Qu’est-ce que l’éthique ?, p. 267
4. Ibid., p. 242