1/ Understanding the Lack of a Foundation for Values: The Failure of Usual Methods

The central idea I wish to defend here is a radical one: at present, there is no foundation for values.

If values are currently without foundation, this means that we lack the means to demonstrate that what we perceive as valuable genuinely holds value, or conversely, that what we regard as lacking value is indeed valueless.
In other words, it would be impossible for us to show that what we love is genuinely worthy of love, or that what we deeply despise is inherently despicable.

This failure, if it is indeed real, appears to stem from the convergence of three fundamental phenomena.

First, as we suggested earlier, the problem of values has been poorly framed, since the concept of value has been conflated with that of the good, the end, and so forth. As a result, we are often answering an entirely different question: we search for our supreme purpose, determine what is most beneficial for humanity, but never truly address what constitutes the greatest value. A poorly posed problem cannot be resolved.

Next, we must ask where, within the realm of knowledge, we might expect to find an account of the foundation of values. The discipline responsible for addressing this issue—axiology—does not yet appear to exist in any developed form. How could we hope to resolve the problem of values if axiology itself remains in its infancy?

In general, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to solve a problem before a discipline dedicated to studying it has come into being. To claim otherwise would be like expecting someone to answer the question 'What is the sum of the angles of a right triangle?' before mathematics had been invented, or to determine the melting point of gold before metallurgy, thermometry, or even chemistry had emerged as fields of enquiry.
As things stand, axiology appears to be little more than a phantom discipline—rarely encountered and lacking substantial content. The problem of values consequently remains largely unresolved.

Finally, it may be that values cannot be established because the methods employed so far have proved inadequate to the task—and it is this point that I now intend to examine in greater detail.