1/ Understanding the lack of a foundation for values: the failure of standard methods

The idea I am seeking to defend consists of a radical negation, that of any actual foundation for values.

If, as I maintain, values are unfounded, this means that it is not currently possible for us to show that what has a positive value for us really has one, or conversely that what has no value for us really lacks one.
In other words, it would be impossible for us to show that what we love is really worthy of love, or even that what we deeply despise is despicable.

This failure, if it is real, arises, it seems to me, from the conjunction of three profound phenomena.

First of all, as we tried to show earlier, the problem of values has been badly posed, since the concept of value has been confused with that of the good, the end, and so on. As a result, we are answering a completely different question: we will look for our supreme end, we will determine the nature of what is most useful to man, but we will never determine what the greatest value is: we cannot answer a badly posed problem.

Next, we need to ask ourselves where in the field of knowledge such knowledge (of the foundation of values) would be deployed, since the discipline responsible for solving such a problem, axiology, does not yet seem to exist. How could we solve the problem of values if axiology does not exist?
In general, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to find the solution to a problem as long as the discipline that has it as its object of study has not been developed. To claim otherwise would be like believing that it was possible to answer the question "What is the sum of the angles of a right triangle?" before mathematics had even been invented, or to determine the melting temperature of gold before metallurgy, the thermometer for measuring that temperature, or even chemistry had been invented.
However, axiology has hitherto been, if we are not mistaken, no more than a phantom discipline whose name is rarely encountered, without it encompassing any content whatsoever; as a result, the problem of values has not been resolved.

Finally, if the values could not be founded, it is perhaps because the methods used to date for such work have proved inoperative. It is this point that I would like to examine in depth.