2/ Review of Extreme Axiological Positions

If it is true that rejecting certain axiological positions is no longer possible owing to the absence of any foundation for values, then the most constructive course may be to listen to these positions; indeed, this appears to be our only option for the time being. This means listening attentively and becoming aware of the activity taking place within the axiological field—attending to the value judgements that people express every day.

The first thing to note is the sheer intensity of activity in this field, with countless value judgements being made each day.
What stands out is the remarkable variety of these judgements—and in particular the fact that almost anything, including the most absurd or cruel ideas, has been ascribed value by someone. This realisation brings home to us that our own value judgements represent only a small fraction of all possible axiological stances, and prompts us to explore those unexpected positions that might not otherwise have occurred to us.

I now propose to examine some of these axiological positions, with a focus on the extreme ones, since extremes often prove the most illuminating when investigating a subject.

1) Nihilism

a) A Catch-All Term

To engage with nihilism effectively, we must first heed the challenge it presents and bring its unsettling claims to our attention. The question arises: what is a nihilist, and what does he have to say to us?

Nihilism is often cited as 'the current of thought' that the study of values is meant to overcome. But before attempting to refute it, ought we not first to hear what the nihilist has to say, to identify what nihilism truly is, and to confront the scandal of the idea head on? Without such openness, opposition to nihilism has so far, it seems, missed its mark.

How, then, should we define nihilism?

From a genealogical perspective, we can trace the history of nihilism as a political and intellectual movement. The term first appeared in 1761 with a religious connotation, then in 1793 in a political context; by 1800, Hegel had used it in a metaphysical sense.
It was not widely current, however, until 1862, when Turgenev introduced it in Fathers and Sons—though Nadezhdin is said to have used it as early as 1830 ¹.
The term gradually came to describe the desperate terrorists—defended by Chernyshevsky in What is to be done? (1862)—who carried out attacks against the Tsar. Following the Congress of Berlin (1878), two failed attempts preceded a third that finally succeeded in 1881, an event that caused a profound shock across Europe.

The term was subsequently associated with German pessimism, led by none other than Schopenhauer. The success of Schopenhauer's philosophy, combined with the impact of the terrorist attacks, raised nihilism to a prominent position in cultural debate. In Germany, as throughout Europe, extensive controversies arose over the nature of pessimism. Nietzsche, initially a follower of Schopenhauer, was publicly branded a 'nihilist'.
Zöckler, in his History of the Relations between Theology and Natural Science, even described Nietzsche as a 'pessimistic nihilist'. Nietzsche, for his part, levelled the charge of nihilism at Christianity, Buddhism, and the ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Schopenhauer.

This raises the question: did nihilism exist before the term was coined? B. Saint-Sernin argues that elements of nihilism can be found in the Indian doctrine of non-existence (nãstitva) and in Greek scepticism: While it may be artificial and historically questionable to apply a modern term to an ancient philosophical school, it is nevertheless useful, in order to understand nihilism as an ideal type, to consider the figure of Pyrrho. In the realm of ideas, ancient scepticism may not be nihilism, but it embodies many of the critical arguments later used by nihilists ². He also identifies a form of Christian nihilism in the 'dark night' experiences of the mystics.

As we can see, this historical survey sheds little light on nihilism's meaning as a concept. What it reveals, rather, is that highly diverse doctrines—with apparently little in common—have been labelled nihilistic. The historical meaning of nihilism thus turns out to be an accumulation of religious, political, philosophical, and moral interpretations, suggesting that nihilism may best be understood as a catch-all concept.

1. Cf. Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale, PUF, Paris, 2004, article "nihilism".
2. Ibid.