A Book on Ethics and the Philosophy of Values

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2/ Review of Extreme Axiological Positions


If it is true that rejecting certain axiological positions is no longer possible due to the lack of foundation for values, then the most constructive course of action may be to listen to these positions; indeed, this appears to be our only option for the time being. This approach involves listening attentively and becoming conscious of the activity within the axiological field—examining the value judgements that people express daily.

The first observation is the intense activity within this field, with countless value judgements being made each day.
What stands out, then, is the remarkable variety of these judgements, particularly the fact that almost anything, including the most absurd or cruel ideas, has been attributed value by some. This realisation makes us aware that our own value judgements represent only a small fraction of all possible axiological stances, prompting us to explore these unexpected positions that might not have occurred to us otherwise.

I now propose to examine some of these axiological positions, focusing on the extreme positions, as it seems to me that extremes often offer the most insight when investigating a subject.


1) Nihilism


a) A Catch-All Term

To engage with nihilism effectively, we must first listen to the challenge it presents and bring its unsettling ideas to our awareness. The question arises: what is a nihilist, and what does he have to say to us?

Nihilism is often cited as 'the current of thought' that the study of values is meant to overcome. But before attempting to refute it, shouldn’t we first listen to what the nihilist has to say, identify what nihilism truly is, and confront the scandal of their idea? Without such openness, it seems that opposition to nihilism has so far missed its mark.

How, then, should we define nihilism?

From a genealogical perspective, we can trace the history of nihilism as a political and intellectual movement. Historically, the term first appeared in 1761 with a religious connotation, then in 1793 in a political context, and by 1800, Hegel had used it in a metaphysical sense.
However, the term was not popularised until 1862, when Turgenev introduced it in Fathers and Sons, although Nadezhdin is said to have used it as early as 1830 1.
The term gradually came to describe the desperate terrorists, defended by Chernyshevsky in What is to be done? (1862), who carried out attacks against the Tsar. These attacks, following the Congress of Berlin (1878), included two failed attempts before a third finally succeeded in 1881, an event that stirred deep emotion across Europe.

The term was subsequently associated with German pessimism, led by none other than Schopenhauer. The success of Schopenhauer's philosophy, alongside the impact of terrorist attacks, elevated nihilism to a prominent cultural position. In Germany, as throughout Europe, extensive debates arose about the nature of pessimism. Nietzsche, initially a follower of Schopenhauer, was publicly branded a 'nihilist'.
Zöckler, in his History of the Relations between Theology and Natural Science, even referred to Nietzsche as a 'pessimistic nihilist'. Nietzsche, in turn, accused Christianity, Buddhism, and the ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Schopenhauer of nihilism.

This led to the question: did nihilism exist before the term was coined? B. Saint-Sernin argues that elements of nihilism can be found in the Indian doctrine of non-existence (nãstitva) and in Greek scepticism: While it may be artificial and historically questionable to apply a modern term to an ancient philosophical school, it is nevertheless useful, in order to understand nihilism as an ideal type, to consider the figure of Pyrrho. In the realm of ideas, ancient scepticism may not be nihilism, but it embodies many of the critical arguments later used by nihilists 2. He also identifies a form of Christian nihilism in the 'dark night' experiences of mystics.

As we see, this historical investigation offers little clarity on nihilism’s meaning as a concept. Instead, we observe that diverse doctrines, with seemingly little in common, are labeled nihilistic. The historical meaning of nihilism ultimately becomes a collection of religious, political, philosophical, and moral interpretations—suggesting that nihilism may be seen as a catch-all concept.


1. Cf. Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale, PUF, Paris, 2004, article "nihilism".
2. Ibid.