A book on ethics and philosophy of values

the French flag

6) The failure of the authority method


Finally, we can consider one last method commonly used to try to establish the value of things: consulting specialists.

If we want to determine the value of music, why not ask the music specialist—the musician? Or, if we want to assess the value of painting, why not turn to a painter?
Specialists, who have spent years with the object of their love, seem to be the most qualified to reveal its value to us.

While this idea is interesting, it seems to have two notable flaws.
Firstly, what the specialist primarily learns about a subject is how to practice it. A professional dancer, for example, will undoubtedly know how to dance better than we do, as this is what they have honed through years of training. However, this does not necessarily mean they understand more about the inherent value of dance itself.
The specialist’s advantage over us, as mere amateurs, lies in their greater experience: they have dedicated more time to the subject than we have, which leads us to assume that only they can discern its value.
However, as previously suggested, one cannot determine the value of something through experience alone. It becomes clear that this method of consulting specialists is essentially just a particular form of the empirical method.

On the other hand, if a specialist—say, a painter—insists that only he can determine the value of a painting, we might respond with the words of the ancient painter Apelles to a cobbler. The shoemaker, an expert in shoes, had laughed at the sandals Apelles had depicted on one of his canvases, prompting Apelles to repaint them. However, when the shoemaker returned the next day and began criticising other parts of the painting, Apelles said, 'Shoemaker, not beyond the shoe.'
In the same vein, we might say to the painter who, as a specialist, claims sole authority to judge the value of painting: 'Painter, not beyond the painting'. We could further suggest that, if he grants specialists the ultimate authority in their respective fields, he might consider allowing the specialist in values, if such a person exists, to speak on the matter: the axiologist.

The failure of these five successive methods, which seem to have been employed without explicit conceptualisation by popular opinion or certain philosophers, might lead us to conclude that values are indeed unfounded. Since every attempt to establish values has depended on one or more of these methods, this significant issue—the absence of a foundation for values—finds its roots in both ancient and modern thought.

A researcher who accepts this reality might then reflect on it and attempt to discern its consequences: if values lack a foundation, how should we then conduct ourselves in life?