These two thinkers, Thales and Cioran, by showing us what authentic nihilism might look like, make us aware of a problem that leaves us deeply perplexed.
The question arises: how does a nihilist live in practice? What kind of praxis logically derives from the theory that 'nothing truly has any objective value'?
There is a mystery here: since the nihilist is not a pessimist and does not value death, he does not want to kill himself; he is not suicidal. On the other hand, not being a sceptic, ataraxia, impassivity, or the insensitivity resulting from epoché is not his authentic mode of being.
Thus, we see the untenable nature of Nietzsche's claim that Pity is the practice of nihilism
1, and the frequent conflation of Christianity with nihilism; Christianity could perhaps be more closely aligned with pessimism.
The true challenge of Nietzschean thought seems to appear more as an effort to combat pessimism rather than nihilism: It makes me happy to see that people do not at all want to thank the thought of death! I would very much like to do something that would make the thought of life even one hundred times more worth being thought to them
2.
However, the refutation of nihilism cannot be identical to the refutation of pessimism that Nietzsche mischievously proposes: Finally, some advice for our dear pessimists and other decadents. It is not in our hands to prevent our birth; but we can correct this mistake — for in some cases it is a mistake. […] Pessimism, pur, vert, is proved only by the self-refutation of our dear pessimists: one must advance a step further in its logic
3, since nihilism refuses to give death any value.
In any case, Thales and Cioran allow us to raise the question: how does a person who rejects both life and death as 'objects of value' act in everyday life?
We will only be able to answer this problem at a later stage. For the moment, we have limited ourselves to determining that nihilism is indeed a consistent axiological doctrine, irreducible to the neighbouring doctrines with which it is often confused.
It is clear, then, that most of the movements or doctrines labelled as nihilistic (the Russian nihilists, Schopenhauer's thought, Christianity, Buddhism, etc.) are not truly nihilistic, and it is even doubtful whether this axiological position has been upheld—in all its radicality—by any author.
There is no paradox here. It is natural, if we reject the idea that the authentic meaning of nihilism is its historical meaning, for us to critically examine those who claim to be nihilists, to see whether they truly adhere to the axiological doctrine they profess, once the meaning of the doctrine has been determined logically—rather than historically. Just as one can claim to be a poet without actually being one, or claim to be a painter while producing mere scribbles, so too can one declare oneself a nihilist while still attributing value to certain actions, such as planting bombs or committing attacks against the Tsar—behaviour that, in fact, denotes an ideal.
Be that as it may, we can now present this extreme axiological position to the researcher, so that they can grasp the scandal it conceals: 'In reality, nothing has value'.
1. Antichrist, §7
2. The Gay science, IV, §278
3. Twilight of the Idols, 36