These two thinkers, Thales and Cioran, by showing us what authentic nihilism might look like, confront us with a problem that leaves us deeply perplexed.

The question arises: how does a nihilist live in practice? What kind of praxis follows logically from the theory that 'nothing truly has any objective value'?

There is a mystery here: since the nihilist is not a pessimist and places no value on death, he has no wish to kill himself; he is not suicidal. Nor, not being a sceptic, is ataraxia, impassivity, or the insensitivity born of epoché his authentic mode of being.
We can see, then, the untenable nature of Nietzsche's claim that Pity is the practice of nihilism ¹, and of the frequent identification of Christianity with nihilism—Christianity might more plausibly be aligned with pessimism.
The true thrust of Nietzschean thought seems to be directed against pessimism rather than nihilism: It makes me happy to see that people do not at all want to thank the thought of death! I would very much like to do something that would make the thought of life even one hundred times more worth being thought to them ².
The refutation of nihilism cannot, however, be identical to the refutation of pessimism that Nietzsche mischievously proposes: Finally, some advice for our dear pessimists and other decadents. It is not in our hands to prevent our birth; but we can correct this mistake — for in some cases it is a mistake. […] Pessimism, pur, vert, is proved only by the self-refutation of our dear pessimists: one must advance a step further in its logic ³—since nihilism refuses to assign any value to death.

In any case, Thales and Cioran allow us to raise the question: how does someone who rejects both life and death as 'objects of value' act in everyday life?

We will only be able to address this problem at a later stage. For now, we have confined ourselves to establishing that nihilism is indeed a coherent axiological doctrine, irreducible to the neighbouring doctrines with which it is so often confused.
It is clear, then, that most of the movements or doctrines labelled nihilistic—Russian nihilism, Schopenhauer's thought, Christianity, Buddhism, and so on—are not truly nihilistic; and it is even doubtful whether this axiological position has ever been upheld, in all its radicality, by any author.

There is no paradox here. Once the meaning of nihilism has been determined logically—rather than historically—it is entirely natural to examine critically those who claim to be nihilists, to see whether they truly adhere to the axiological doctrine they profess. Just as one can claim to be a poet without actually being one, or declare oneself a painter while producing mere scribbles, so too can one profess to be a nihilist while still attributing value to certain actions—such as planting bombs or carrying out attacks against the Tsar—conduct that, in fact, betrays an ideal.

Be that as it may, we are now in a position to present this extreme axiological stance to the researcher, so that they may grasp the scandal it conceals: 'In reality, nothing has value'.

[Go to the next chapter]

1. Antichrist, §7
2. The Gay science, IV, §278
3. Twilight of the Idols, 36