2) Other extreme axiological positions

We can imagine another extreme axiological doctrine which, in contrast to nihilism, maintains that 'everything has value'. I propose calling this doctrine 'Eclecticism'.
This position asserts that everything has value, including things that seem flawed or imperfect. In fact, even things commonly hated or despised (such as evil, suffering, etc.) have great value.

This axiological doctrine finds echoes in certain Stoic ideas. Although Stoicism cannot be reduced to eclecticism, I suggest that certain foundational Stoic texts vividly illustrate this doctrine.

For example, this text: We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit.
And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and many other things- though they are far from being beautiful, if a man should examine them severally- still, because they are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind.
So that if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure ¹.

The Stoic idea of the absolute value of the world, including parts that only seem imperfect, aligns closely with the core notion of eclecticism: everything has value.
This perspective leads the Stoic sage to bear with serenity all that befalls him, including the most calamitous events, because they are part of the world he loves and praises: Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature ².

The world—the great Whole—has absolute value because it is cosmos, not chaos—a principle of order, harmony, and rationality. Events do not unfold randomly, but everything happens according to the laws of pure necessity: Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it ³.

However, Stoicism seems to differ from eclecticism in that it condemns certain human behaviours—lamenting, rebelling, and refusing to accept harmful events that befall us. In condemning these actions, Stoicism assigns them negative value, a concept foreign to eclecticism. Why such condemnation?

First of all, in a world subject to strict determinism, it becomes pointless to wish for anything other than what has actually happened to us. If it was foreseen from all eternity that my child would die this day, and it was impossible for him to escape his fate, then it becomes pointless to resist, to lament when such an event occurs. Struggle only makes sense if I can change the course of events, and the death of a loved one is only painful and scandalous if it happened by chance, and could just as easily have happened much later.

The person who laments or rebels against the world is, in Stoic eyes, ignorant, failing to understand the world in which he lives and missing the inexorable necessity that renders his revolt futile—and therefore absurd. Above all, for Stoicism, the rebel—by complaining about various events—presents the absurd image of a part trying to cut itself off from the greater whole in an attempt to live independently.

This excessive pride is condemnable not only because it represents an impossible wish but because, in doing so, the rebel becomes like a tumor in the world—a part that tries to detach itself from the Whole: The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained ⁴.

As we can see, the Stoic condemns a wide range of behaviours, so Stoicism does not affirm the universal value of all acts or events. This distinction fundamentally separates Stoicism from eclecticism.

1. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book III, 2
2. Ibid., Book IV, 23
3. Ibid., Book X, 5
4. Ibid., Book II, 16