2) Other Extreme Axiological Positions

We can conceive of another extreme axiological doctrine which, in contrast to nihilism, holds that 'everything has value'. I propose calling this doctrine 'Eclecticism'.
This position maintains that everything has value, including things that seem flawed or imperfect. Even things commonly hated or despised—evil, suffering, and the like—are held to have great value.

This axiological doctrine finds echoes in certain Stoic ideas. Although Stoicism cannot be reduced to eclecticism, certain foundational Stoic texts vividly illustrate the doctrine.

Consider the following: We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit.
And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and many other things- though they are far from being beautiful, if a man should examine them severally- still, because they are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind.
So that if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure ¹.

The Stoic idea of the absolute value of the world—including those parts that only appear imperfect—sits very close to the core tenet of eclecticism: everything has value.
This perspective leads the Stoic sage to bear with serenity whatever befalls him, including the most calamitous events, because they are part of a world he loves and affirms: Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature ².

The world—the great Whole—has absolute value because it is cosmos, not chaos: a principle of order, harmony, and rationality. Events do not unfold at random; everything occurs according to the laws of pure necessity: Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it ³.

Stoicism seems to part ways with eclecticism, however, in that it condemns certain human behaviours—lamenting, rebelling, refusing to accept the harmful events that befall us. In condemning these, Stoicism assigns them negative value, a concept foreign to eclecticism. What is the basis for such condemnation?

In a world governed by strict determinism, it is pointless to wish for anything other than what has actually befallen us. If it was ordained from all eternity that my child would die this day, and it was impossible for him to escape his fate, then lamenting when this occurs serves no purpose. Resistance makes sense only if we can alter the course of events, and a loved one's death is painful and scandalous only if it happened by chance and might just as well have occurred far later.

In Stoic eyes, the person who laments or rebels against the world is simply ignorant: he fails to understand the world he inhabits, and is blind to the inexorable necessity that renders his revolt futile—and therefore absurd. More fundamentally, the rebel—by protesting against events—presents the absurd spectacle of a part attempting to sever itself from the greater whole in order to live independently.

This excessive pride is condemnable not only because it represents an impossible wish, but because in harbouring it the rebel becomes like a tumour in the world—a part that strives to detach itself from the Whole: The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained ⁴.

As we can see, Stoicism condemns a wide range of human behaviours; it does not affirm the universal value of all acts or events. This distinction marks a fundamental divide between Stoicism and eclecticism.

1. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book III, 2
2. Ibid., Book IV, 23
3. Ibid., Book X, 5
4. Ibid., Book II, 16