2/ A Comparison of the Axiological Epoché with Cartesian Epoché

Descartes, as we know, proposes a hyperbolic doubt, to determine whether there is any proposition that can withstand this doubt, i.e. that is of indubitable truth. This doubt, elaborated at length in the first two Meditations, is described as radical by Descartes and is generally accepted as such, though there is the possibility of a logical circle between the cogito, which establishes God's existence, and God, who ultimately guarantees the truth of the cogito.

I would like to raise this question again: is Descartes' doubt really radical and hyperbolic? Could it be that Descartes, perhaps unconsciously, retained an implicit assumption at the core of his doubt?

I believe this is indeed the case. A close reading reveals, in my view, an underlying axiological theory regarding what holds value and what does not. Descartes did not abandon this axiological theory at the foundation of his doubt; instead, he preserved and relied upon it—not to establish the cogito itself, but to use it as a launching point for the subsequent step: establishing the existence of God, upon whom he would then base his confidence in the truth of the world.

Descartes’ axiological theory appears to involve a two-part process. First, he attempts to demonstrate that God represents the supreme value through three arguments. Then, having asserted this, he endeavours to prove God’s existence on the basis of this conclusion—attempting, in effect, to infer God’s existence from His value.
This dual movement is what I intend to explore and question.

First, it is worth noting that Descartes uses the term 'perfection' instead of 'value' to articulate his axiology. For example, Descartes never speaks of the 'infinite value' of God, but rather of His 'sovereign perfection': God, on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection ¹.
This term applies not only to God but also to other things, from the moment they possess what we would call value: Since our ideas can’t get their forms or their being except from external objects or from ourselves, they can’t represent any reality or perfection that isn’t either in those objects or in ourselves ². For example, freedom is not considered to have a value but a perfection: In our case indifference is a defect rather than a perfection of freedom ³.
Thus, for Descartes, God is the supreme value: That substance which we understand to be supremely perfect and in which we conceive absolutely nothing involving defect or limitation of its perfection, is called God ⁴.

On what basis does he make this assertion? Let us now examine the three ideas that support it and assess their legitimacy.

First, Descartes asserts that the traditionally accepted notion of God is that of a perfect being. The concept of a perfect being has been labeled 'God'; therefore, God is perfect: I based the proof of the existence of God on the idea that I find in myself of a supremely perfect being, which is the ordinary notion we have of God ⁵.
The principle underlying this reasoning is: God is perfect, therefore He is the supreme value. This reasoning rests on two premises:
First, that perfection has value, and even the greatest value—to be perfect is to possess the highest value.
Second, that we can use the concept of perfection (rather than value) to address and solve the problem of values, treating value and perfection as interchangeable terms.

However, these two premises seem uncertain to me.

Indeed, as our axiological epoché suggests, we can conceive of an axiological position that asserts the opposite—that imperfection holds value. For instance, a sketch might be considered more interesting than a finished work of art, precisely because its incompleteness is what gives it value. Take the Venus de Milo, for example—hasn't part of its masterpiece status been attributed to the fact that its two arms are lost forever? Similarly, there are many minds for whom the part is more beautiful than the whole, the hypothesis than the system, the charm than the beauty, the attempt than the success, and even the defeat than the victory. Moreover, doesn’t the nihilist precisely deny that perfection holds any value?

Furthermore, the concept of perfection seems inadequate for addressing the axiological question. To explore this, we must ask: what do we truly mean when we say something is perfect?

1. Metaphysical Meditations, III
2. Letter to Vattier, 22 February 1638
3. Letter to Mersenne, 21 April 1641
4. Replies to 2nd objections, Def VIII
5. Letter to Mersenne, July 1641