2/ A Comparison of the Axiological Epoché with Cartesian Epoché

Descartes, as we know, proposes a hyperbolic doubt in order to determine whether any proposition can withstand it—that is, whether any truth is genuinely indubitable. This doubt, elaborated at length in the first two Meditations, is described as radical by Descartes himself and is generally accepted as such, though a possible logical circle between the cogito—which establishes God's existence—and God—who ultimately guarantees the truth of the cogito—remains a matter of debate.

I wish to revisit this question: is Descartes' doubt truly radical and hyperbolic? Might Descartes have retained, perhaps unconsciously, an implicit assumption at the very heart of his doubt?

I believe this is indeed the case. A close reading reveals, in my view, an underlying axiological theory concerning what holds value and what does not. Descartes did not abandon this axiological theory at the foundation of his doubt; instead, he preserved and relied upon it—not to establish the cogito itself, but to use it as a springboard for the next step: establishing the existence of God, upon whom he would then ground his confidence in the truth of the world.

Descartes' axiological theory appears to involve a two-stage movement. First, he attempts to demonstrate that God represents the supreme value, by means of three arguments. Then, having asserted this, he endeavours to prove God's existence on the basis of that conclusion—seeking, in effect, to infer God's existence from His value.
It is this dual movement that I intend to examine and question.

First, it is worth noting that Descartes uses the term 'perfection' rather than 'value' to articulate his axiology. He never speaks of the 'infinite value' of God, for instance, but of His 'sovereign perfection': God, on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection ¹.
The term applies not only to God but to other things as well, whenever they possess what we would call value: Since our ideas can't get their forms or their being except from external objects or from ourselves, they can't represent any reality or perfection that isn't either in those objects or in ourselves ². Freedom, for example, is held not to have a value but a perfection: In our case indifference is a defect rather than a perfection of freedom ³.
For Descartes, then, God is the supreme value: That substance which we understand to be supremely perfect and in which we conceive absolutely nothing involving defect or limitation of its perfection, is called God ⁴.

On what grounds does he make this claim? Let us examine the three ideas on which it rests and assess their legitimacy.

First, Descartes asserts that the traditionally received notion of God is that of a perfect being. The concept of a perfect being has been given the name 'God'; therefore, God is perfect: I based the proof of the existence of God on the idea that I find in myself of a supremely perfect being, which is the ordinary notion we have of God ⁵.
The underlying principle of this reasoning is: God is perfect, therefore He is the supreme value. This rests on two premises:
First, that perfection has value—indeed, the greatest value: to be perfect is to possess value in the highest degree.
Second, that the concept of perfection (rather than value) can be used to address and resolve the problem of values, treating the two terms as interchangeable.

Both premises seem to me questionable.

As our axiological epoché suggests, we can readily conceive of an axiological position asserting the opposite—that imperfection holds value. A sketch, for instance, may be considered more interesting than a finished work of art, precisely because its incompleteness is what gives it value. The Venus de Milo is a case in point: has not part of its status as a masterpiece been attributed to the permanent loss of its two arms? There are many minds for whom the part is more beautiful than the whole, the hypothesis than the system, the charm than the beauty, the attempt than the achievement, the defeat than the victory. And does the nihilist not deny, precisely, that perfection holds any value?

Furthermore, the concept of perfection seems ill-suited to addressing the axiological question. To see why, we must ask: what do we truly mean when we say that something is perfect?

1. Metaphysical Meditations, III
2. Letter to Vattier, 22 February 1638
3. Letter to Mersenne, 21 April 1641
4. Replies to 2nd objections, Def VIII
5. Letter to Mersenne, July 1641