Eclecticism could also be linked to the type of doctrine known as theodicy. Theodicy, or the justification of God, seeks to absolve God from the existence of evil in the world: how can God’s existence, goodness, and omnipotence be reconciled with the fact that evil prevails? How can a God claim to be honoured when he remains silent in wars, allowing millions of souls to perish without intervening?

In his famous Essays on Theodicy, Leibniz undertakes the formidable task of defending God’s case.
Without delving into the complex argumentative framework Leibniz constructs—such as distinctions between different kinds of will (antecedent and consequent, permissive and productive), types of evil (metaphysical, moral, and physical), types of knowledge (simple intelligence, vision, or middle knowledge), and his analysis of Grace—we can nonetheless see how theodicy might be compared to eclecticism.
This justification of God rests, in part, on the idea that what appears to us as evil is often, in fact, a good when viewed from a different perspective: Sometimes evils [...] are to be considered as some subsidiary goods, as means for greater goods ¹. Consequently, Every time a thing seems to be reprehensible in the works of God, we are to think that we do not know enough about it, and that a wise man, understanding it, would judge that one could wish for nothing better ².

Here again, we observe what seems to align theodicy with eclecticism. However, eclecticism appears irreducible to these neighbouring doctrines for two reasons.

First of all, in theodicies, evil has no value in itself; its value derives from being a means to a greater good, making it ultimately a good in some way. Theodicies assert the non-existence of evil rather than its inherent value, as they reduce it to a particular form of good. Alternatively, if they acknowledge evil’s existence, they never claim that it has intrinsic value; instead, they see it as valuable only insofar as it contributes to achieving the ultimate good, which holds real value.
In contrast, eclecticism—the doctrine under examination here—asserts that everything has intrinsic value, independent of any other thing or perspective; everything possesses absolute value, including evil.

On the other hand, Leibniz's theodicy uniquely does not claim the world is perfect. Rather, it holds that, while the world contains imperfections, God has created the world with the fewest possible imperfections. This leads to his famous assertion that this world is the best of all possible worlds: Between the possible sequences of things, infinite in number, God chose the best, and consequently, the best is the one which exists in act ³.

What is the source of this imperfection that still resides in the world? Evil, in each of its three forms: metaphysical evil (imperfection), physical evil (suffering), and moral evil (sin). As a result, evil has a negative value; it is a source of imperfection, not perfection. The only value it can occasionally acquire is as a means to a higher end: the realisation of good.

This concludes the distinction between theodicy and Eclecticism, which attributes an absolute value to evil, as it does to everything else.

This raises the question of whether any thinker has supported such an axiological position; probably not. It is even possible that no one has ever held this doctrine. In reality, it seems that this does not matter. The axiologist is someone whose task is to explore conceivable doctrines of value; if he unearths one that has never been embraced, it is a gold digger's triumph for him.

1. Essays on theodicy, Causa dei asserta, §35
2. Ibid., §47
3. Ibid., §41