Eclecticism might also be linked to the type of doctrine known as theodicy. Theodicy, or the justification of God, seeks to absolve God from responsibility for the existence of evil in the world: how can God's existence, goodness, and omnipotence be reconciled with the prevalence of evil? How can a God claim to be honoured when he remains silent in the face of war, allowing millions of souls to perish without intervening?

In his celebrated Essays on Theodicy, Leibniz undertakes the formidable task of defending God's case.
Without entering into the complex argumentative framework Leibniz constructs—distinctions between different kinds of will (antecedent and consequent, permissive and productive), types of evil (metaphysical, moral, and physical), types of knowledge (simple intelligence, vision, or middle knowledge), and his analysis of Grace—we can nonetheless see how theodicy might be compared to eclecticism.
This justification of God rests, in part, on the idea that what appears to us as evil is often, in reality, a good when viewed from a different perspective: Sometimes evils [...] are to be considered as some subsidiary goods, as means for greater goods ¹. Consequently, Every time a thing seems to be reprehensible in the works of God, we are to think that we do not know enough about it, and that a wise man, understanding it, would judge that one could wish for nothing better ².

Here again, we can see what might seem to align theodicy with eclecticism. Eclecticism nonetheless appears irreducible to these neighbouring doctrines, for two reasons.

First, in theodicies, evil has no value in itself; its value derives from serving as a means to a greater good, making it ultimately a form of good. Theodicies assert the non-existence of evil rather than its inherent value, reducing it to a particular form of good. If they do acknowledge evil's existence, they never claim that it has intrinsic value; rather, they see it as valuable only insofar as it contributes to the realisation of the ultimate good, which alone holds real value.
Eclecticism, by contrast—the doctrine under examination here—holds that everything has intrinsic value, independent of anything else or any particular perspective; everything possesses absolute value, evil included.

Furthermore, Leibniz's theodicy does not claim that the world is perfect. It holds, rather, that while the world contains imperfections, God has created it with the fewest possible imperfections—hence his celebrated assertion that this world is the best of all possible worlds: Between the possible sequences of things, infinite in number, God chose the best, and consequently, the best is the one which exists in act ³.

What is the source of the imperfection that still resides in the world? Evil, in each of its three forms: metaphysical evil (imperfection), physical evil (suffering), and moral evil (sin). Evil thus carries a negative value; it is a source of imperfection rather than perfection. The only value it can occasionally acquire is instrumental—as a means to a higher end: the realisation of good.

This marks the boundary between theodicy and Eclecticism, which attributes absolute value to evil as it does to everything else.

This raises the question of whether any thinker has ever defended such an axiological position—probably not. It is even possible that no one has ever genuinely held this doctrine. In reality, this hardly seems to matter. The axiologist is someone whose task is to chart the conceivable doctrines of value; if he unearths one that has never been embraced, it is something of a prospector's triumph.

1. Essays on theodicy, Causa dei asserta, §35
2. Ibid., §47
3. Ibid., §41