Indeed, the two proofs of God's existence that Descartes presents in the third and fifth Meditations rely entirely on the three debatable axiological positions we have identified. Thus, as we shall see, he deduces God's existence from His value.

The first proof can be summarised as follows: In the 'I', whose existence I have just demonstrated, I find the idea of God. This idea is therefore indubitably present in my mind. How do I move from the existence of the idea to the existence of its object (i.e. from the formal reality to the material reality of the idea)? In other words, how do I prove that God truly exists, rather than merely being an idea in my mind?

This is where Descartes uses the first axiologically dubious position we identified. This idea of God is that of a perfect being (as we have previously defined), which implies an infinite God, since to be infinite is to exist without any limitation, equating being with perfection.

Descartes then deduces the real existence of God from the infinite nature of this idea, using the second dubious axiological position—namely, that the cause is always more valuable than the effect.
Where can this idea of an infinite, i.e. perfect, God come from in me? What could be its cause? Only a being that is also infinite, and therefore perfect, could be the cause, since something of lesser value cannot be the cause of something with greater value. Thus, God exists as the necessary cause of the idea whose presence I undoubtedly find in myself: The more carefully I concentrate on these attributes, the less possible it seems that any of them could have originated from me alone […] It is true that my being a substance explains my having the idea of substance; but it does not explain my having the idea of an infinite substance. That must come from some substance that is itself infinite ¹.

Thus, we can see that Descartes' dubious axiology is deeply embedded in his logical reasoning: in fact, his logic is built on his axiology, and his judgements here are primarily value judgements.

The second proof of God's existence, presented in the fifth Meditation, can be summarised as follows: The idea of God is that of a perfect being, and what exists is more perfect than what does not exist (or, put differently, perfection, value, and existence are synonymous). Therefore, God exists.
This famous argument has been incorrectly referred to as the 'ontological argument'. In reality, it is an ontological-axiological argument—a logical monster, attempting to deduce an ontological reality from an axiological position.

Kant's criticism of the ontological argument likely missed its target. By using the example of the hundred thalers to show that existence is not a predicate like any other, Kant ventured into ontological considerations, which could be countered, as Hegel did, with other ontological arguments. In fact, this argument should perhaps be analysed from the perspective in which it is truly situated—that is, studied as an axiologist, rather than as a logician.
This reasoning relies on the first two questionable axiological positions we identified: that perfection has value, and that perfection and being are identical.

We could counter this by proposing that what holds value is nothingness, and therefore that God, as the supreme value, does not exist. Alternatively, we could argue that perfection is not the supreme value, and therefore we cannot deduce God's existence from His perfection. In short, Descartes can be countered by a range of opposing axiological judgements. We could also deny that an ontological result can be deduced from an axiological premise, as these two spheres are distinct. Finally, we could argue that it is impossible to deduce a certain ontological judgement from a questionable axiological position.

As we can see, Descartes' axiology forms the basis of his conclusions. In the Cartesian approach, then, we do not find a purely logical proof of the existence of God, devoid of value judgements. Instead, we see that Descartes relies on a questionable axiology to move beyond the certainty of the cogito, which is purely logical.
What explains the shift, from the second to the third Meditation, from a purely logical perspective to an axiological one? It lies in the fact that Descartes does not attribute value to the 'I'—at least not at this stage—though, as we have seen, he subtly includes value in the very definition of God. Thus, as long as Descartes remains with the cogito, or the demonstration of the 'I's' existence, he does not invoke any consideration of value. However, as soon as he discusses God, the notion of value enters the argument, even if it is under the guise of 'perfection'.

The epoché, included in Descartes' radical doubt, is confined to questions of fact—specifically, of existence: 'Does X exist? I must doubt it,' says Descartes, leading him, over the course of the first Meditation, to doubt the existence of everything presented to him by his senses, his reason (such as mathematical 'realities'), and even God.
For Descartes, the question is: "Does God exist?" and not "Does God have value?" which he never doubts.
This becomes evident as early as the first Meditation, where he questions the truth of mathematics by imagining that God is so powerful He could deceive us. However, he immediately reassures himself, God is so good that he cannot do that; an evil genius, on the other hand, can. Thus, the concept of the evil genius serves as a symptom of Descartes' inability to conceive of a God without value, leading him to invent a separate concept that connects divinity and imperfection.

Descartes' entire approach centres on proving that God exists: And just as I can imagine a winged horse even though no horse has wings, so I can attach existence to God in my thought even if no God exists ²...and the objections raised against him (for example, by Hobbes) stem from the same perspective: does this idea of God truly exist within us or not? To this, Descartes replied: Also, someone who denies having any idea of God, in my sense of ‘idea’, is making the most impious confession he could make ³.

It is the existence of things that poses a problem, not their value. This leads to the following hypothesis: the problem of values may never have occurred to Descartes. In any case, despite its ambition, Descartes' famous 'hyperbolic' doubt is not truly radical, as it leaves the entire sphere of values untouched. What undermines the Cartesian approach is that, following the Cogito, Descartes fundamentally relies on dogmatic and questionable value judgements to claim he has reached the indubitable. In reality, Descartes appears to remain trapped within the confines of the ego. He was unable to move beyond it to demonstrate the certainty of God, and subsequently of the world, as he had intended.

Thus, we sought to understand the nature of the axiological epoché we are proposing, drawing inspiration from Descartes' model as he tried to explore the possibility of radical doubt. We observed that Descartes engaged in a different kind of epoché—an ontological one, which focuses on judgements of reality or existence, and therefore could not serve as inspiration for our approach. We also concluded that this approach failed, because, being covertly based on an axiology, it required support from an axiological epoché—something we found lacking in Descartes' work.

Nevertheless, we may have uncovered an interesting insight: our search for the value of things is distinct from determining their existence. In other words, we do not ask whether something exists, but whether it has value.

1. Metaphysical Meditations, III
2. ibid, V
3. Replies to fifth objections of Gassendi