3) Evil

A third extreme axiological position remains to be examined: the affirmation of evil, that is, the belief that cruelty, violence, and the suffering of others hold great value. This stance is radically distinct from eclecticism, as it does not extend to valuing the Whole. For the lover of evil, goodness, morality, the pursuit of others' happiness, and pity are utterly contemptible.

This position seems challenging to grasp, as many moral treatises seldom address authors who have affirmed the value of evil, such as Sade. This should, however, be a starting point, as we can only counter challenges to morality by first listening to their arguments. Indeed, it is notable that works focusing on the problem of evil often lack any reference to the immoralists.

Here, we are dealing with a very particular kind of evil—not the evil done out of ignorance, coercion, or unintentionally. It is not the evil committed due to a troubled integration into an unjust society, which might reject me, as some sociologists suggest. Nor is it the evil that might result from a physiological defect affecting my judgement.
In short, we are considering unapologetic evil—the evil arising from a conscious, reasoned, and voluntary affirmation: 'Evil has great value' or 'Evil holds more value than good.' I will refer to this position as 'radical evil'.

The very notion that a person could genuinely support such an idea—that they might love evil for its own sake—is rarely accepted, as sociological, biological, or psychoanalytical explanations of evil predominate today. According to these interpretations, a love of evil is viewed as a symptom, whether social or psychological, whose underlying cause must be addressed to 'cure' the individual, who is typically seen as a victim of an alienating society.

For the axiologist, however, the love of evil is an entirely coherent doctrine worth considering, since the value of morality remains unfounded, and at present, there is no substantial condemnation of immorality that would enable us to conclude it has no value.
To label evil as merely a symptom or disease is to assume that no one can rationally, with full awareness, choose evil or love it for its own sake. Instead, it is assumed that a person only succumbs to evil under compulsion—whether from society, childhood experiences, or the atypical structure of their brain.

The axiologist, however, would maintain that, given no value is truly founded, the love of good is no more rational than the love of evil. While many harmful actions may indeed have psychoanalytical or sociological explanations, a specific form of evil must nonetheless be seriously considered, which is expressed in this axiological position: evil is the supreme value.

To preserve neutrality, we must take this position seriously; otherwise, the immoralist could argue that axiological inquiry is inherently biased and therefore flawed. Thus, we must, even if it goes against our deepest instincts and causes us to recoil at the thought of all that this proposition entails, admit that perhaps evil possesses value...

Once again, it proves challenging to identify an author who explicitly defends this position, just as it was with eclecticism. Two names immediately come to mind: Nietzsche and Sade; yet, as we shall explore, it does not appear that either can fully exemplify what we mean by the love of evil.