To begin with, it is true that we often have the impression that perfection is accorded the highest value. As Lavelle puts it: Perfection is the extreme peak of value ¹.

On reflection, however, we realise that the concept of perfection carries a different meaning: when we describe something as perfect, we generally mean that it has achieved the greatest value it is capable of.
A perfect cup of coffee, for instance, would be one combining the ideal aroma, bitterness, and temperature for the drinker. A perfect circle is a figure whose radii are all truly equidistant from the centre. Yet no one has ever claimed that the perfect cup of coffee or the perfectly drawn circle holds supreme value.

When we call something perfect, we are in fact referring not to an absolute or ultimate value, but to a relative and limited one. A circle may be perfect in the sense that all its radii are equal, but it holds no value beyond that—and its value exists only in comparison to the other geometric figures we might clumsily draw on a blackboard.

The concept of perfection, therefore, is not the 'extreme point of value' it may appear to be; on the contrary, it designates a degraded and inferior form of value—relative value.

One might go further and argue that the concept of perfection bears no relation to value at all. To say that something is perfect often means that it has become everything it could be. As Misrahi puts it, Traditionally, perfection is the completed fullness of a being, but this fullness exists only as an essence or idea ².
In this sense, we would say that a horse is perfect because it possesses all the attributes of a horse: speed, a long mane, muscularity, and so on. A perfect radiator, similarly, would be one that radiates gentle heat, never breaks down, and, in short, possesses all the attributes we expect of a radiator.

This meaning, however, severs the concept of perfection from any relation to value, shifting it entirely into the domain of essence: to be perfect is to be all that one can be—to achieve the fullness of one's essence, to actualise all one's potential. This is an ontological determination, not an axiological one. Perfection obtains when the reality of a thing corresponds to its concept; the value of that thing, or concept, remains entirely undetermined. In other words: the perfection of something characterises its essence, not its value.

This becomes clearer when we consider the arresting concept of 'perfect evil', which designates an action so extreme that it fully corresponds to the very concept of evil—evil unfolded to its fullest potential, evil in its complete form. Here, the concept of perfection no longer bears on value, still less on supreme value; it simply designates the relationship between a concrete fact and its essence or concept.

The concept of perfection, then, cannot effectively address the problem of values: it misframes the issue by deploying a term suited to questions of essence—or, at best, of relative values—rather than to absolute value.

This exposes the inadequacy of Descartes' first argument for attributing supreme value to God. We may grant that perfection is part of God's definition; but we cannot allow Descartes to implicitly confer supreme value upon God, since value and perfection are not equivalent—value is not contained within the definition of perfection. The question of whether perfection holds value remains entirely open.

1. Traité des Valeurs, I, 2, 4°
2. Qu'est-ce que l'éthique ? Armand Colin, Paris, 1997, Glossaire analytique, « Perfection », p.258