A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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3/ The epoché of values


1/ Description and legitimisation of the suspension of value judgements


It may now be time to describe the state of mind a researcher must adopt to fully grasp the interest and implications of the discipline of axiology.

Firstly, I suggested that since values were unfounded prior to the establishment of this discipline, it is currently impossible to confirm or deny the value of what we love or hate. Secondly, we noted that the axiological field is composed of an overwhelming diversity of value judgements. Finally, I introduced the idea that many of these judgements represent axiological positions that are astonishing, scandalous, absurd, or immoral—positions that cannot be outright rejected.
What kind of state of mind should this evoke?

If there is no definitive proof in the realm of values and nothing can be said to possess intrinsic value, it seems we must suspend all value judgements, though not all judgements altogether.
Once we accept our profound ignorance regarding what does or does not hold value, we must cease condemning what we find despicable (such as violence) and refrain from praising what we find admirable. This state of axiological neutrality is precisely the stance we have pursued since the outset of our inquiry.

Such a mindset is rare; it resembles becoming like a 'sponge', existing without attachment, without loving or despising anything. Although this state of mind may seem absurd, we believe it to be essential for intellectual honesty, once we understand and sincerely accept that no value has yet been established.

This state of mind stands in stark contrast to the peculiar contemporary attitude that MacIntyre describes, which could be called 'perpetual indignation'. In essence, it involves masking our inability to establish values by constantly and vigorously protesting against all value judgements we find shocking, absurd, or scandalous.

MacIntyre notes that this phenomenon especially influences moral value judgements: In the United Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 what has since become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for any assertions whatsoever is followed with great rigor 1. Conversely, any perceived violation of rights is met with the utmost fervour, as though this emotional intensity could substitute for reason or serve as justification in itself. Since we are unable to reject unpalatable value judgements through logical means, such as argument, we attempt to dismiss them through emotional means—through tone, indignation, an ineffective method if ever there was one. Or rather, This is not to say that protest cannot be effective; it is to say that it cannot be rationally effective 2.

Other emotional tactics, such as laughter or sarcasm, are also employed—for instance, mocking the nihilist. This is seen in media interventions by committees promoting various causes, perpetually indignant and seeking to move us, attempting to validate their struggle by using all the rhetorical tools of emotion at their disposal.

However, as Aristotle pointed out in Rhetoric, rhetoric that lacks enthymemes—syllogisms or oratorical arguments—and relies solely on emotional appeal is an empty discipline. It cannot function without rational processes: Proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art; everything else [emotions raised by a discourse] is merely an accessory 3.

1. After Virtue, ch. 6, p. 70
2. Ibid., p. 71
3. Rhetoric, Book I, ch. 1