Descartes presents a second argument to demonstrate the value of God: he supports the axiological position that being equates to value (or perfection), and that the more degrees of objective reality a thing possesses, the greater its value or perfection.
Thus, substances are superior in value to accidents: Undoubtedly, the ideas that represent substances amount to something more—they contain within themselves more representative reality—than do the ideas that merely represent modes [or accidents] ¹.

This identification of being with value leads to God being the supreme value, the sovereign perfection, because he possesses the most objective reality for two reasons.

Firstly, because he is infinite—meaning his being has no limitations or negations; he is entirely being: God, on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection ².
Secondly, because he gives himself existence: It is a common notion that if a thinking being doesn’t depend on anything else, then it is God. Why? Because if something’s existence is due to itself, we can’t doubt that it will have given itself as many perfections as it could recognize ³.

The corollary of this equation—being equals value—is that nothingness has no value: I also have what you might call a negative idea of nothingness (that which is furthest from all perfection) ⁴.

However, this axiological position, which asserts that being has value and nothingness has none, cannot be accepted as self-evident; this is precisely what nihilism contests. It is also contested by the dreamer, who claims that what does not exist—what is dreamt or imagined—has more value than what is merely real.
The persistence of this unfounded doctrine suggests that while Descartes subjected his epistemological certainties to radical doubt, he did not apply the same scrutiny to his axiological certainties.
Thus, once again, we see that Descartes’ second argument to prove the value of God lacks a solid and certain foundation.

Finally, Descartes' third argument for proving that God is the supreme value is based on the axiological position that the cause inherently has more value (or perfection) than the effect: One should note that we have ascribed to God the dignity inherent in being a cause in such wise that no indignity inherent in being an effect would follow thence in him […] Although I have granted that God can in a certain sense be called the cause of himself, nevertheless nowhere have I in the same way called him an effect of himself ⁵.

We have already encountered this axiological position in our study of Nietzsche ⁶, and we observed that this idea of aristocratic origin is entirely debatable: what originates from a humble or despicable source can infinitely surpass in value its origin; likewise, the effect can exceed the cause. We have used examples such as Napoleon, who came from a modest family in Corsica, or a river, which vastly exceeds in magnitude its initial source.
We could define axiological materialism as the doctrine that posits the inferior (such as chemical particles or biological cells) as the cause of the superior (such as consciousness or the mind), meaning that the effect is always superior to the cause.

Thus, even if Descartes' second axiological position could hold, the opposite might also be true, rendering it unfounded and not indubitable—it is, in fact, doubtful. It cannot therefore be accepted as an absolutely certain truth, as Descartes seems to do. Like the first axiological position we just examined, this one also does not seem to be subject to radical doubt; in fact, neither of these two fundamental dogmas is.

To summarise: the choice of terminology (using 'perfection' to signify value) and these three axiological positions combine to form what might be called Descartes' implicit doctrine of values.

We have seen that each of these points is problematic, and thus, Descartes' axiological doctrine, while not necessarily false, is at least questionable. As such, it should be subject to Descartes' epoché, suspension of judgement, and radical doubt, in which he searches for something truly indubitable. However, this is not the case. This doctrine of values is neither asserted nor employed in the first two Meditations, where Descartes affirms and then progressively rejects doubtful ideas. It appears from the third Meditation onward—after the Cogito—where Descartes claims to have grasped an indubitable truth: I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking ⁷.

It becomes clear that there is a difficulty in moving from this initial truth to a second one. How will Descartes move beyond the ego, whose existence he has confirmed, to reach the truth of the world? As we know, he would have to rely on the truth of an 'intermediary', God. Descartes' steadfast requirement to accept only unquestionable truths, and not to mix anything doubtful with his reasoning, clearly remains intact. His progression must therefore be based on indubitable truths.

The hypothesis I propose is that it was at this precise moment, when Descartes sought to bridge the gap between the ego and the world through the mediation of God, that he employed this dubious axiological doctrine, despite the fact that only unquestionable judgements were supposed to be permitted.

1. Metaphysical Meditations, III
2. ibid.
3. Letter to Mersenne, 15 November 1638
4. Metaphysical Meditations, IV
5. Answers to fourth objections
6. Book I
7. Metaphysical Meditations, II