A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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c) Is nihilism a kind of skepticism?

Nietzsche does not equate nihilism with scepticism; he views scepticism not as an illness but as a strength of will and thought. For Nietzsche, scepticism is a symbol of strength because it represents intellectual honesty: I put aside a few sceptics, the types of decency in the history of philosophy: the rest haven’t the slightest conception of intellectual integrity 1.

Moreover, scepticism is synonymous with fortitude, as it resists confinement to a particular belief, while the need for belief—like any need—is a sign of weakness:
Do not let yourself be deceived: great intellects are sceptical. Zarathustra is a sceptic. The strength, the freedom which proceed from intellectual power, from a superabundance of intellectual power, manifest themselves as scepticism. Men of fixed convictions do not count when it comes to determining what is fundamental in values and lack of values. Men of convictions are prisoners. […] On the contrary, the need of faith, of something unconditioned by yea or nay, of Carlylism, if I may be allowed the word, is a need of weakness. The man of faith, the “believer” of any sort, is necessarily a dependent man—such a man cannot posit himself as a goal, nor can he find goals within himself 2.

The scepticism Nietzsche admires here is likely that of Montaigne, with whom he shared deep intellectual affinities 3. Notably, on Christmas Day in 1870, Nietzsche received Montaigne's Essays from Cosima Wagner. He later expressed his admiration for Montaigne on several occasions: Basically it is a small number of the older Frenchmen to whom I return again and again and explicitly referred to the author of the Essays: I have something of Montaigne’s mischievousness in my spirit, who knows? Perhaps also in my body 4. Like Montaigne, who saw himself as always learning and making trial 5, Nietzsche claimed for himself the perilous prerogative of spending a life in experiment and of running adventurous risks 6.

What links nihilism and scepticism, making them comparable for some authors (such as B. de Saint-Sernin), is their shared radical rejection of the world, to which both seem to lead. This commonality provides grounds for examining them together.


d) Criticism of this confusion of nihilism with pessimism and scepticism

These difficulties likely arise because we have conflated the authentic meaning of nihilism with its historical meaning. We now see that this meaning fluctuates and is often attributed to doctrines that may not be nihilistic. In other words, the search for the essence of nihilism relies on examining examples labelled as nihilistic, but without certainty. The logical circularity here is evident.

We will therefore adopt a different approach. We will discard the supposed examples of nihilism, as we cannot be certain of their true nihilistic nature. Thus, we will not attempt to define nihilism by examining pessimism, Christianity, or similar doctrines. This raises the question: how can we seek the meaning of nihilism now that we appear to have set aside the conventional means of understanding it?

Our answer is to examine nihilism from the only thing we know with certainty: its name, 'nihilism'.
What does 'Nihil' truly signify, this 'nothing' that nihilism expresses in its very name? What is the 'nothing' that characterises the ‘man of nothing’? I believe it pertains to the following assertion: in reality, if we truly understand the nature of things, nothing possesses any real, objective value.

From this initial definition, which nihilism conveys through its name, we can apply the principle that a concept only holds meaning if it is distinct from other neighbouring concepts. Rather than assimilating it directly to scepticism, pessimism, or Christianity—which would cause it to disappear rather than enrich its meaning—we will examine if it can be distinguished from these doctrines.

Pessimism can be defined as the axiological doctrine that views life, the world, and things as devoid of value, leading to a state of sadness, resentment, and even suicide. This brings us to the radical distinction between pessimism and nihilism: while nihilism claims that life, the world, and things have no real value, it also asserts that death, sadness, resentment, and nothingness are equally devoid of real value. Indeed, as 'contents of meaning', death and sadness suffer the same fate the nihilist inflicts on all contents of meaning: the negation of any real value. Granted, this distinction might seem purely formal, even sophistical—like splitting hairs. Yet, I believe it holds a significant consequence: nihilism is not pessimism.

Pessimism is a doctrine that, in its own way, values sadness or death, perhaps as the only authentic attitudes of the wise person (even if it does not explicitly use the concept of 'value' in its reasoning). As such, pessimism is one of those viewpoints that 'still attribute value to something'.
The nihilist is unique in placing no value on anything, on any content of meaning. The nihilist may attribute meaning and truth to things and concepts, but no value. Therefore, he stands on radically different ground, which needs further reflection.

Nihilism, as presented by Nietzsche, is not authentic nihilism, but rather classic pessimism. Nietzsche describes the 'nihilist' as someone who despairs of the world upon realising that his three ideals—purpose, unity, and truth—are not embodied in reality. It is based on his ideals that the 'nihilist' condemns the world, and thus Nietzsche portrays a nihilist who holds ideals—a true contradiction in terms—essentially someone who still places value (and the highest value) on many things.

This meaningless conception of an idealist nihilism is reflected here: The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain. But whence this: there ought not to be 7.

Thus, we see how pessimism and nihilism are distinct, forming two consistent axiological positions: whereas nihilism denies the value of any content of meaning, pessimism ascribes value to certain actions and thoughts, with its painful emotions and negative reflections potentially arising from… an ideal.


1. The Antichrist, 12
2. The Antichrist, 54
3. N. Panichi, in the Revue Noésis, n°10, 2006, p.93-112
4. Ecce Homo, Why I am so clever, §3
5. Essays, II, 2, 805 B
6. Human, All Too Human, Preface, §4
7. The Will to power, Book 1 : the European Nihilism, 36, p. 49