IV/ Reconfiguration of the Field of Knowledge

If axiology were to emerge as a new discipline, it would likely lead to a reconfiguration of the field of knowledge. Axiology may not merely position itself alongside existing disciplines but could establish various complex connections with them.
Some disciplines may even become obsolete if axiology proves more adept at addressing issues they once sought to resolve. Aesthetics, for example, might be one such discipline. Let us now examine whether aesthetics retains its legitimacy within this newly reconfigured field of knowledge.

1/ Questioning the Legitimacy of Aesthetics and the Concept of Beauty

1/ The Three Types of Pleasure: Physiological, Aesthetic and Axiological

We have already discussed the fundamental phenomenon of value being forgotten, primarily due to its assimilation with other concepts, such as 'the good' or 'the end'.
This oblivion inevitably gives rise to another: the forgetting of the subjective feeling aroused by a thing's value—specifically, the pleasure derived from recognising the value of something, or axiological pleasure.

The existence and nature of this feeling seem self-evident: when I believe something, like nature, holds great value and is worthy of love, any engagement with it (such as a walk in nature) brings me immense pleasure.
Studying this 'axiological pleasure' is a crucial aspect of axiology. It must be compared with two other types of pleasure: aesthetic pleasure, which arises from a thing's beauty, and physiological pleasure, which is sensory (or what might be termed 'the agreeable'). Whether other types of pleasure exist lies beyond our current scope.

We need to determine whether these three types of pleasure are truly irreducible to one another, or whether one might be an empty concept that in fact subsumes the other two, which alone remain coherent. To this end, we will examine the object of each type of pleasure and consider whether these objects are genuinely distinct.

Thus, we ask: does the concept of beauty truly have a coherent meaning that cannot be reduced to other concepts?

The concepts of the agreeable and of value seem most closely related to beauty. 'Agreeable' appears synonymous with beauty, as finding a work beautiful involves feeling pleasure in seeing or hearing it, which renders it agreeable to the senses.
Similarly, 'value' seems synonymous with beauty, as calling a painting beautiful implies that it holds great aesthetic value.

Yet beauty seems to differ from the agreeable. For example, eating an apple is agreeable, but seeing it in a still life is not—it is simply beautiful. In this sense, the pleasure we experience in viewing the apple is entirely different from the pleasure of eating it. The pleasure of the aesthete is distinct from that of the gastronome, which compels us to distinguish between these two forms of pleasure: the agreeable and the beautiful.
Moreover, the concepts of beauty and value appear fundamentally different, as we can readily imagine individuals who, despite being deemed of little moral value on account of wickedness or stupidity, nonetheless possess great physical beauty. A clear distinction can thus be drawn between a person's beauty and their value.

Beauty, therefore, seems to have a distinct and coherent meaning, separate from related concepts, suggesting that aesthetic pleasure must be fundamentally different from both axiological and physiological pleasure—with 'aesthetic' understood here in its later, post-1750 sense rather than the ancient 'aisthesis'.

However, this preliminary reflection should not be taken as definitive, and we must re-examine: does beauty truly have a meaning that is distinct from the concepts of value and the agreeable?