This question requires us to consider how we perceive reality, as though it could inherently possess qualities such as beauty and ugliness.
Our perception 'doubles' reality, much like in Platonic thought, as we often separate an object from its beauty.
For example, we separate the lion from its beauty, as though they were two distinct realities. We make statements such as 'It's not the lion I love, it's its beauty.'
However, we must consider that the lion may be nothing more than its beauty. In other words, the lion is those sinuous, powerful curves, the exuberance of its mane, and that cold, tranquil gaze.
Thus, we do not take pleasure in the lion's beauty, but in 'the lion itself' or a particular aspect of it. So it is not a case of saying "The beauty of this object pleases me", but "This object pleases me".
Consequently, beauty appears to be a redundant concept. Could we not simply say that there is no 'beautiful,' only objects we like or dislike?
Since we often love only one aspect of the object (such as the lion's power or its mane) rather than the entire object, we might conclude that it is not the lion itself but its beauty that we love. In fact, what we love is a part of the lion, a signifying element within it, rather than some separate ontological entity called 'beauty.'
So what happens in so-called aesthetic pleasure is a certain relationship to the thing itself, and not to its beauty. The question is: what exactly is the nature of this relationship? What does it mean when something 'pleases' us? In my view, it means finding that the thing, or something in it, has value.
Thus, I believe we can return to the solution we previously set aside: beauty is an empty concept, devoid of meaning in itself, and can be reduced entirely to the concept of value.
Returning to our example, a man of no value (a murderer) may still be handsome. Shouldn't we distinguish between beauty and value? We can explain this situation as follows.
There is no beauty in this man, as beauty is an empty concept. However, two significant elements in him hold great value for me: his square chin conveys power, and his blue eyes suggest gentleness. Softness and power are two meaningful concepts, unlike beauty.
Since I find these qualities valuable, I take great pleasure in contemplating this man. However, another element—his meanness—carries a very negative value for me. In my final assessment, I deem him worthless.
In this situation, the pleasure I take in contemplating this man is not aesthetic pleasure from his beauty, but axiological pleasure from the value of certain elements I perceive in him.
Thus, we can summarise our proposal: so-called aesthetic pleasure is, ultimately, just axiological pleasure, derived not from beauty, but from the value of the object.