This question requires us to consider how we perceive reality, as though it could inherently possess qualities such as beauty and ugliness.

Our perception 'doubles' reality, much as in Platonic thought, in that we tend to separate an object from its beauty.
For example, we separate the lion from its beauty, as though they were two distinct realities. We make statements such as 'It's not the lion I love, it's its beauty.'
Yet we must consider that the lion may be nothing more than its beauty. In other words, the lion just is those sinuous, powerful curves, the exuberance of its mane, and that cold, tranquil gaze.
Thus, we do not take pleasure in the lion's beauty, but in 'the lion itself' or a particular aspect of it. The point, then, is not to say 'The beauty of this object pleases me', but rather 'This object pleases me'.

Consequently, beauty appears to be a redundant concept. Could we not simply say that there is no such thing as 'the beautiful'—only objects we like or dislike?
Since we often love only one aspect of an object (such as the lion's power or its mane) rather than the object in its entirety, we might be tempted to conclude that it is not the lion itself but its beauty that we love. In fact, what we love is a part of the lion, a signifying element within it, rather than some separate ontological entity called 'beauty'.

What occurs in so-called aesthetic pleasure is thus a certain relationship to the thing itself, and not to its beauty. The question then becomes: what exactly is the nature of this relationship? What does it mean for something to 'please' us? In my view, it means finding that the thing, or something within it, has value.

I therefore believe we can return to the solution we previously set aside: beauty is an empty concept, devoid of meaning in itself, and can be reduced entirely to the concept of value.

To return to our earlier example: a man of low moral value (a murderer) may still appear handsome. Does this not compel us to distinguish between beauty and value? The situation can be accounted for as follows.

There is no inherent 'beauty' in this man, since beauty is an empty concept. However, two elements in him hold significant value for me: his square chin conveys strength, and his blue eyes suggest gentleness. Softness and power are meaningful qualities, unlike beauty.
Because I find these qualities valuable, I take pleasure in contemplating this man. Yet another element—his cruelty—carries a negative value for me. In my overall assessment, I regard him as devoid of worth.
In this situation, the pleasure I take in contemplating this man is not an aesthetic pleasure derived from beauty, but an axiological pleasure derived from the value of specific elements I perceive in him.

We can thus summarise our proposal: so-called aesthetic pleasure is, in the final analysis, nothing but axiological pleasure—derived not from beauty, but from the value of the object.