2/ The Relations Between Axiology and Other Disciplines in General

Axiology aims to determine the value of things, and value pertains to a thing's essence. Identifying the essence of things would therefore seem necessary before assessing their value—a task addressed primarily by the sciences.

From this, we might draw a twofold conclusion: first, that axiology is entirely dependent on other sciences for its research, and second, that since the sciences can only ever capture partial reflections of a thing's essence, they may never fully grasp its true nature. Consequently, axiology itself might never be fully constituted, given that understanding a thing's essence is fundamental to determining its value.

We can overcome this difficulty not by assuming—without foundation—that the sciences will one day fully succeed, but rather by reconsidering whether it is the 'real' essence of 'real' things that holds value.

In fact, axiology requires only a 'content of meaning' whose value it seeks to investigate. Its sole requirement for its object is that it possesses meaning. The question of whether something actually exists to correspond to this content of meaning can be set aside as irrelevant to axiology. Why?
Were axiology to require the real existence of things in order to affirm their value, this would imply that the discipline assumes real existence to be inherently valuable—that is, that what exists is more valuable than what does not.

This presupposition is unfounded. One could equally imagine an opposing axiological stance asserting that what holds great value is precisely what does not exist—what is imagined, dreamt, or chimerical. Were axiology to adopt such an unwarranted assumption from the outset, it would lapse into dogmatism and forfeit any prospect of success. Axiological inquiry must therefore begin with a suspension (epoché) of all value judgements.
Real existence cannot serve as a criterion of value, at least in the early stages of axiological research (though it may emerge as a conclusion). We therefore do not inquire whether the contents of meaning whose value we are investigating correspond to things that genuinely exist, since to do so would be to imply that existence is itself a determinant of value.

Existence may, on the other hand, add nothing to the inherent value of a thing, only to its relative importance for us. Consider the following: let us assume that a law prohibiting slavery possesses great intrinsic value. Even before it was enacted—that is, before it 'came into existence'—it already held this value. Once passed and implemented, its value neither increases nor decreases, though its importance becomes far greater for those who were previously enslaved and have since gained their freedom. Similarly, cruelty can be deemed contemptible even before any specific act of cruelty has occurred.

When determining the value of a thing, it is therefore unnecessary to concern ourselves with its existence or non-existence, since existence does not alter intrinsic value. In other words, we can enquire whether the concept of 'human' has value without first needing to establish whether human beings truly exist.
The point is precisely to set aside the question of reality. We need not wait for physics to determine the true laws of nature, since our concern is with the value of both real and hypothetical physical laws.
One source of axiology's epistemological certainty lies in its capacity to bracket the question of what is real within its investigation.

Axiology is also resilient against sceptical critique. It is the concept of 'meaning' that withstands scepticism, which otherwise tends to undermine everything else.
To question whether 'the cat is black', one must first understand the meaning of what is being questioned; otherwise, the doubt itself loses coherence, and one no longer knows what one is doubting. Doubting the existence of a cat requires understanding the concept of 'cat', even while questioning its existence. Sceptical doubt bears on the reality of a content of meaning—suggesting that nothing real corresponds to it—while leaving the meaning itself intact. To doubt something is, at the very least, to acknowledge its meaning; otherwise, there is nothing to doubt.

The object of axiology is always a specific content of meaning=X, whose value is to be determined. Axiology's suspension of any judgement regarding the reality of this content of meaning is its sole point of contact with phenomenology.
Returning to our initial question, we can now see that axiology does not need to wait for the sciences to arrive at a full understanding of the essence of their objects. Axiology does not seek value in the essence of things but rather in their meanings, which need not correspond to existing things. It is sufficient that those meanings be coherent and intelligible—that they constitute meanings in their own right.