2/ The Relations Between Axiology and Other Disciplines in General

Axiology aims to determine the value of things and value pertains to a thing's essence. Thus, identifying the essence of things appears necessary before assessing their value, a task primarily addressed by the sciences.

From this, we might reach a twofold conclusion: first, that axiology is entirely dependent on other sciences for its research, and second, that since sciences can only capture partial reflections of a thing's essence, they may never fully grasp its true nature. Consequently, axiology itself might never be fully constituted, as understanding a thing’s essence is fundamental to determining its value.

We can overcome this difficulty not by assuming—without foundation—that sciences will someday fully succeed, but rather by reconsidering whether it is the 'real' essence of 'real' things that holds value.

In fact, axiology requires only a 'content of meaning' whose value it seeks to investigate. Axiology’s sole requirement for its object is that it possesses meaning. The question of whether something actually exists to correspond to this content of meaning can be set aside as irrelevant to axiology. Why?
If axiology were to require the real existence of things to affirm their value, it would suggest that the discipline assumes real existence has inherent value—implying that what exists is more valuable than what does not.

This presupposition is unfounded, as we could imagine an opposing axiological stance asserting that what holds great value is precisely what does not exist—what is imagined, dreamt, or chimerical. If axiology were to adopt such an unwarranted assumption from the outset, it would lapse into dogmatism and compromise any hope of success. Axiological inquiry, therefore, must begin with a suspension (epoché) of all value judgements.
Thus, real existence cannot serve as a criterion of value, at least in the early stages of axiological research (though it may emerge as a conclusion). Consequently, we do not inquire whether the contents of meaning whose value we are investigating correspond to things that genuinely exist, as this would imply that existence itself is a determinant of value.

On the other hand, existence may add nothing to the inherent value of a thing, only to its relative importance for us. For instance, let us assume that a law prohibiting slavery possesses great intrinsic value; even before it was enacted (that is, before it 'came into existence'), it already held this value. Once passed and implemented, its value neither increases nor decreases, though its importance becomes far greater for those who were previously enslaved and have now gained freedom. Similarly, cruelty can be deemed contemptible even before any specific act of cruelty occurs.

Thus, when determining the value of a thing, it becomes unnecessary to concern ourselves with its existence or non-existence, as existence does not alter its intrinsic value. In other words, we can question whether the concept of 'human' has value without needing to establish whether human beings truly exist.
The point is precisely to set aside the question of reality. We do not need to wait for physics to determine the true laws of nature, as our focus is on the value of both real and hypothetical physical laws.
One source of axiology’s epistemological certainty lies in its ability to ignore the question of what is real within its investigation.

Additionally, axiology remains resilient against sceptical critique. It is the concept of 'meaning' that withstands scepticism, which otherwise tends to undermine everything else.
For instance, to question whether 'the cat is black,' we must first understand the meaning of what we are questioning; otherwise, the doubt itself loses coherence, and we no longer grasp what we are doubting. Doubting the existence of a cat requires understanding the concept of 'cat,' even as we question its existence. Sceptical doubt pertains to the reality of a content of meaning, suggesting that nothing real corresponds to it, while leaving the meaning itself intact. To doubt something is to at least acknowledge its meaning; otherwise, there is nothing to doubt.

The object of axiology is always a specific content of meaning=X, whose value must be determined. Axiology’s suspension of any judgement regarding the reality of this content of meaning is its only point of connection with phenomenology.
Thus, in response to our initial question, we see that axiology does not need to wait for the sciences to fully understand the essence of their objects. In fact, axiology does not seek value from the essence of things but rather from their meanings, which need not correspond to existing things. It is sufficient that they be coherent and meaningful, allowing them to constitute meanings in themselves.