3/ The Last Bastion of Aesthetics: The Concept of Form

The concept of form is the last line of defence that aesthetics might use to justify its legitimacy.

The (Kantian) argument goes like this: an object consists of both its matter and its form. These two ontologically distinct aspects produce different kinds of pleasure: it is different to take pleasure in eating the substance of an apple than in admiring its beautiful, round shape.
Thus, the unique pleasure derived from the form, rather than the matter, of an object justifies the existence of an aesthetic domain and the discipline that studies it: aesthetics.

But does this distinction between matter and form truly hold? Suppose I draw random, meaningless lines on a canvas—what is the form, and what is the matter? Now, let us say I am standing in front of Mont Blanc. I am filled with awe, but I am told I should only be moved by the form. So, I attempt to strip away anything to do with matter, although it is unclear what that entails. Perhaps I eliminate the colours, leaving only the contours. I am left with a series of lines that rise and fall, resembling the curve of a company’s profit fluctuations. Naturally, I feel no emotion—no more than I would looking at such a graph in a business report.

Furthermore, even if the matter-form distinction were meaningful, it does not govern our emotions when we view an object or painting. We do not experience things by consciously distinguishing between matter and form, just as we do not separate the line sung by the brunettes from that sung by the blondes in a chorus. While such distinctions may technically exist (there is indeed a line sung by brunettes, just as there is form and matter in a work), they do not shape our authentic 'aesthetic' experience. Since we aim to capture real aesthetic experience rather than an abstract one that may never occur, the form-matter dichotomy becomes irrelevant.

In fact, we have already suggested that the spectator does not concern themselves with the ontological status of the content of meaning they perceive in the work. To do so would be to intellectualise the spectator, compelling them to ask questions they are not actually asking. Thus, the aesthete enjoys the content of meaning as it appears, without considering whether it is a matter of form or content.

Finally, even if one were to take pleasure in the form, we could argue that this pleasure arises from attributing value to the form. Thus, this pleasure would ultimately be axiological rather than purely aesthetic. Since both matter and form can give axiological pleasure, the distinction becomes unnecessary.

4) Questioning the Exact Meaning of the Greek 'Kalos'

We must ask whether this hypothesis aligns with the Greeks' experience of art.

Greek thought presents a certain kind of beauty that deserves serious consideration: the beauty of noble actions and virtuous souls, as conceptualised, for instance, in Plato's Symposium. How are we to understand Socrates' claim in the Gorgias that the useful, the good, and other qualities are beautiful? ¹ Aesthetics, when limited to the matter/form paradigm, cannot address this kind of beauty; this paradigm confines beauty to things composed of matter and form, that is, to material and sensible objects.

With the birth of modern aesthetics, beginning with Kant, many realities formerly regarded as beautiful (such as noble actions) are excluded from aesthetic consideration. This shift renders much of the Greek experience of beauty incomprehensible to minds adhering to modern aesthetic frameworks.
Consequently, the beauty of reality is diminished, as many authentic forms of beauty fall outside the 'possibility of beauty'.
This brings us to a key question: what, then, was the Greek experience of beauty?

It has already been noted that the Greeks did not possess the modern concept of value. Nevertheless, addressing the problem of values was a central concern for them. Although they lacked a specific term for 'value', Greek thought was steeped in this concept, as seen in their inquiries into the 'supreme good'. As we have observed, Greek terms such as 'agathon', 'ariston' or 'beltistou' came to represent aspects of value, each carrying a range of meanings. The term kalos, often translated today as 'beauty', is, in my view, an anachronistic translation that falls short of capturing the Greek experience of beauty.

I propose instead that kalos and agathon are not words to translate different experiences of 'distinct meanings' (beauty and virtue), but rather different experiences of a single, unified meaning. For instance, agathon conveys the revelation of a thing's value through our active relationship with it, through praxis, while kalos conveys the revelation of value through contemplation, theoria.
In this hypothesis, the difference between kalos and agathon does not signify a division between beauty and value, or beauty and goodness, as modernity interprets it, but rather a distinction in how value is perceived—through action versus contemplation. Thus, the Greeks may not have had a notion of 'beauty' as we understand it today; instead, they held a concept of value, expressed through the notions of agathon and kalos.

The unfortunate modern translation rooted in the matter/form duality has led to a loss of the Greek experience of beauty, which is fundamentally an experience of value. This understanding is essential for interpreting the Gorgias formula, 'virtue = useful = pleasant = beauty'. Essentially, this statement conveys that the value of the useful, the pleasant, and similar qualities becomes evident through contemplation, providing us with axiological pleasure.

Therefore, the well-known Greek phrase kalos kai agathos, usually translated as 'beautiful and good', might instead signify 'that whose value is revealed through both contemplation and action'.
I am not in a position to verify this hypothesis fully; doing so would require an examination of many Greek texts that contain the terms kalos and agathos, in order to first understand their ordinary usage in Greek society and then to interpret how different philosophers used them. This task lies beyond my expertise. Thus, we should consider this as a mere suggestion, with no claim to scientific validity. Nevertheless, I believe it is acceptable to propose hypotheses occasionally, provided they are presented as suggestions rather than as conclusions from a rigorous study.

If this hypothesis holds true, it is essential to explore its implications for aesthetics.

1. For example here: « All laws and practices are beautiful because they are beneficial or pleasant or both » (474e-475b)