A book on ethics and philosophy of values

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2/ Defence of the idea that axiology belongs in the theoretical sphere


We must consider why axiology, aside from its overlap with the practical science of morality, might spontaneously appear to belong to the practical sphere.

Firstly, there may be a tendency to believe that solving the problem of values would have inevitable implications for our actions and could drastically alter our way of life. If we were able to determine what is most valuable—which is not assumed here—we would have identified the ultimate goal toward which our existence should aim.

This idea presents two difficulties (aside from whether such a discovery is even possible).

Firstly, the fact that determining what holds—or lacks—value could significantly influence human behaviour does not mean that axiology is a practical discipline. Axiology would only be considered practical if we could assert that this behavioural change constitutes its essence or ultimate purpose.
However, the view I wish to defend is that this connection to action is inessential to axiology; it is merely secondary or derivative.
By analogy: just because human beings walk, we cannot define them as legs or assert that walking constitutes their essence. Thus, we would fail to understand human beings if our reflection on them were limited to a detailed study of walking. Similarly, the fact that axiology may have practical implications for human action does not make it a practical science, nor will we understand its true nature by determining what behaviour it might inspire.
In summary, axiology is fundamentally a theoretical science, though it may have practical consequences.

Furthermore, determining what has the greatest value does not necessarily disclose what should constitute humanity’s ultimate end.

Let us revisit the distinction we previously proposed between value and end 1: it is possible that what holds the greatest value could be either harmful or indifferent to humanity.
If this were the case, we would not necessarily need to adopt this supreme value as our life’s goal. Instead, by recognising its nature, we might choose to orient our lives around a more relative value—namely, what is beneficial to humanity.
Unlike the notion of duty, value is not inherently linked to obligation; it does not, therefore, impose acceptance. Value asserts itself, like truth, but it does not compel—just as science does not force scientists or humanity at large to accept any particular idea.

If we were able to determine that something holds value, this discovery would not lead to a regulated world where everyone is compelled to adopt these values. Rather, it would lead to an 'existentialist' world where each individual decides whether to embrace true values or merely human values—those that hold significance for us personally.
This is why we believe the axiology project and existentialist doctrine are fundamentally compatible, although we do not have the opportunity to explore this articulation here.

We can arrive at the same conclusion from a different perspective: even if we were to identify the supreme value, our actions would not necessarily adopt it as their goal, because it is not value but the nature of human action that must determine the goal of that action.
Human action depends on numerous factors: it involves the body, the unconscious, desire, feelings, and society—in short, it is shaped by psychological, physiological, sociological, and other influences. It remains uncertain whether value can permeate the interplay of these factors and influence them to become the criterion guiding our actions. Moreover, it is debatable whether it should—whether it is even desirable for human action to cease being driven by desire, feelings, and similar impulses in order to be guided solely by value.

This perspective may seem surprising, but it is implicit in the idea that axiology is not concerned with (human) good or values specifically related to human beings, but with real value, considered independently of humanity.

This explains why, for us, axiology is neither a practical science nor a human science: its purpose is not to identify what is beneficial for humanity or to alter human behaviour. If it has any potential implications for human action, these are incidental rather than essential.
Thus, the potential outcomes of axiology hold no more practical relevance for us than a disinterested effort to determine the precise size of a distant celestial object, whose remoteness precludes any attempt at exploration.

We can see, therefore, why axiology is, for us, a theoretical science: it does not aim to bring its object into existence but seeks to uncover a particular 'property' within objects—namely, value. Unlike the human sciences, which are centred on humanity, axiology is directed toward the world—similar to fields like mathematics, physics, and biology—and, more broadly, toward all contents of meaning. This orientation aligns axiology more closely with the hard sciences than with the human sciences, not due to any certainty in its findings, which remains unknown, but due to its object of study.

In summary, our hypothesis is this: axiology, if it holds any significance as a discipline, is a theoretical science capable of producing practical consequences. Its focus is directed not toward humanity, but toward the world as a whole, or rather, as a jewel case of all possible things of value.

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1. Cf Book I