3/ The relations between axiology and ontology

The essential content of ontology seems rooted in an age-old debate between idealism and realism. What is real? Are ideas or things more real? Is thought or matter the true foundation of reality? Alternatively, we could reverse the question: is the material world we perceive the real world, or is there another, hidden world?

As we have shown, axiology can bypass this debate, as it does not question the existence of what it seeks to value. When axiology aims to determine the value of an object (a tree, for instance), it does not need to ask whether the object is an idea, a material entity, a thing-in-itself, a phenomenon in the Kantian sense, or an event or a collection of atoms.
Whatever answer ontology provides to these questions, axiology requires only the presence of a 'content of meaning=X' with an undetermined ontological nature, which it must assess for value. This feature grants axiology the unique independence of not needing to take sides in ontological debates, as the answer to these questions, whatever it may be, does not impact its inquiry.

The concept of 'content of meaning' is thus essential in meeting this requirement: it does not judge whether the referent of meaning is a material thing or a mere representation, but abstracts from their ontological status to retain only the meaning. Whether thing or idea, the X considered always conveys the same meaning. A photographed horse and a real horse share the same meaning: horse.

To sum up, axiology is entirely independent of the controversies between realism and idealism (in the Kantian sense). This is why axiology distances itself from metaphysics, given that the ontological nature of things appears profoundly irresolvable—like any good metaphysical problem.