I/ The Concept of the Good

Any concept that involves an essential imperfection must be set aside. The principal defect of the concept of the good is its ambiguity.
Kant demonstrated that 'good' may mean either 'agreeable' (Wohl) or 'moral good' (Gut). In the following sentences — 'This ice cream tastes good' and 'It's good for you to do your homework' — the word 'good' is used in two distinct senses.

To identify only two distinct meanings within the concept of the good, however, is already to underestimate its ambiguity. An ambiguity that splits a concept into two meanings is not a true ambiguity; it is only a slight equivocation, quickly resolved—a momentary pause in reflection that requires no explicit correction, context alone being sufficient.

No less than six meanings may be attributed to 'good' in the expression 'It is good'. Good may refer to:
- Agreeable, e.g., 'Where can we eat a good ice cream?' Here, 'good' refers to something that 'affords pleasure'.
- Happiness, e.g., 'It is good that you came'. In this context, 'good' means 'It makes me happy'.
- Usefulness, e.g., 'That is a good knife'. Here, 'good' implies 'It is useful' or 'It serves my interests'.
- Truth, e.g., 'It is a good definition'. In this context, 'good' means 'a true definition' or 'It is true'.
- Value, e.g., 'a good painting'. Here, 'good' means 'a valuable painting' or 'It has great value'.

The concept of 'good' is thus rendered unreliable by these multiple meanings, and when we use it to pose the problem of values, we risk confusion and absurdity, since its precise meaning is never determinate.
Using the concept of 'good' to pose the axiological question (such as by classically asking 'What is the supreme good?') makes the task vastly more difficult from the outset of an inquiry that is already formidable enough.

To avoid ambiguity, then, we must either abandon the concept of 'good' altogether, or restrict it to a single meaning—the 'moral good'—and take care always to specify as much. Accordingly, the word 'good' will never appear here in isolation; it will always be qualified by the adjective 'moral'. Used alone, it misleads: its apparent singularity conceals the six distinct meanings it indiscriminately conflates.
To build an axiology on the word 'good' is therefore to require an auxiliary discipline—hermeneutics—tasked with recovering the author's intended meaning in each axiological judgement from its context.

This ambiguity is also present in the ancestor of our concept of 'good': the Greek word agathon.
A difficulty presents itself here: there is no direct Greek equivalent for the English term 'value'. In Plato and Aristotle, we find only the concept of agathon (αγαθόν), which has been translated as 'good'.

Can we say that the ancients had no notion of value simply because the word did not exist? Must we assume they had not considered this issue? That would be absurd. Plato, for instance, is clearly concerned with establishing hierarchies of value, or with identifying the single true hierarchy, making him one of the first philosophers to engage directly with the problem of values.
As Lavelle noted, It is only nowadays that we ask ourselves whether an independent science of values, called axiology, may be constituted. However, the inquiry into values is as old as reflection itself ¹.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is no Greek equivalent for the English word 'value'. The Greek term axion, from which 'axiology' derives, is cognate with the modern notion of 'value', signifying 'that which is precious' or 'worthy of esteem' ². However, in ancient thought, the concept of agathon (good) was used to explore values, rather than axion; the pursuit was for the 'sovereign good', not the 'supreme value'.

The concept of agathon, moreover, carries the same ambiguity as 'good'. Plato himself acknowledges this ambiguity: in the Republic, he remarks that some people claim that the good consists in the intelligence... of the good. But what do they mean by this? It is not absurd if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of good, as if we understood their meaning when they utter the word 'good' ³.

1. Traité des valeurs, I, 1
2. Ibid.
3. Republic, 505b-c