I/ The concept of good

A concept must be rejected if it involves an essential imperfection. The main defect of the concept of good is its ambiguity.
Kant has shown that 'good' may mean 'agreeable' (Wohl) or 'moral good' (Gut). In the following sentences, 'It is good to eat an ice cream' and 'It is good for you to do your homework', the concept of good has two different meanings.

However, it underestimates the ambiguity of the concept of good to identify only two distinct meanings within it. An ambiguity that splits a concept into two meanings is not a true ambiguity; it is only a slight equivocation, quickly resolved—a simple pause in reflection that does not even need explicit correction, as context alone suffices.

No less than six meanings may be attributed to 'good' in the expression 'It is good'. Good may refer to:
- Agreeable, e.g., 'Where can we eat a good ice cream?' Here, 'good' refers to something that 'provides a certain amount of pleasure'.
- Happiness, e.g., 'It is good that you came'. In this context, 'good' means 'It makes me happy'.
- Usefulness, e.g., 'That is a good knife'. Here, 'good' implies 'It is useful' or 'It serves my interests'.
- Truth, e.g., 'It is a good definition'. In this context, 'good' means 'a true definition' or 'It is true'.
- Value, e.g., 'a good painting'. Here, 'good' means 'a valuable painting' or 'It has great value'.

The concept of 'good' is thus weakened by these multiple meanings, and when we use it to pose the problem of values, we risk falling into confusion and absurdity, as its precise meaning remains unclear.
Using the concept of 'good' to pose the axiological question (such as by classically asking 'What is the supreme good?') makes the task vastly more difficult from the outset, in a pursuit that is already laden with significant challenges.

In summary, to avoid ambiguity, we must either abandon the concept of 'good' or restrict it to a single meaning: the 'moral good' (and ensure that we always specify 'moral good'). Therefore, we will never use the word 'good' on its own; it will always be accompanied by the adjective 'moral'. When used alone, it is misleading, as its singularity is deceptive; it is invariably accompanied by six different meanings that it freely combines.
Constructing an axiology based on the word 'good' thus imposes the need for an auxiliary discipline: hermeneutics, which must determine the precise meaning of each axiological judgement by attempting to trace the author’s intended meaning within its context.

This ambiguity is also present in the ancestor of our concept of 'good': the Greek word agathon.
One issue arises: there is no direct Greek equivalent for the English term 'value'. In Plato and Aristotle, we find only the concept of agathon (αγαθόν) which has been translated as 'good'.

Can we say that our ancestors had no notion of value simply because the word did not exist? Must we assume they had not considered this issue? That would be absurd. For instance, Plato seems eager to establish hierarchies or to identify the only true hierarchy. He is one of the principal philosophers whose primary aim is to address the problem of values.
As Lavelle noted, It is only nowadays that we ask ourselves whether an independent science of values, called axiology, may be constituted. However, the inquiry into values is as old as reflection itself ¹.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is no Greek equivalent for the English word 'value'. The Greek term axion, from which the term 'axiology' is derived, has a connection to the contemporary idea of 'value,' as it signifies 'that which is precious' or 'worthy of esteem' ². However, in ancient thought, the concept of agathon (good) was used to explore values, rather than axion; the pursuit was for the 'sovereign good', not the 'supreme value'.

Furthermore, the concept of agathon carries the same ambiguity that characterises the concept of 'good'. This ambiguity is even noted by Plato himself: in the Republic, he remarks that some people claim that the good consists in the intelligence... of the good. But what do they mean by this? It is not absurd if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of good, as if we understood their meaning when they utter the word ‘good' ³.

1. Traité des valeurs, I, 1
2. Ibid.
3. Republic, 505b-c