If we refer to the highest value as the 'supreme good' and reach this through the concept of the end, we presuppose something significant. Namely, we assume that this supreme value can be aimed at by individuals and, more broadly, by humanity as an end. Aiming at something as an end is only feasible if it presents an advantage for us—that is, in the broad sense, if it is neither harmful nor indifferent to us. This advantage may take various forms: it could be moral (helping us perfect ourselves), useful, pleasant, or even financial.
Considering something as an end for humanity implies that it is beneficial to the human species as a whole and to each individual. This is a self-interested idea presupposed in any use of the concept of an end.

If, then, we pose the problem of values in the form 'What is the supreme end?' we immediately frame our question—ideally neutral—with a major presupposition: we assume that whatever occupies the highest place in the hierarchy, the supreme value, is useful, well-disposed, and beneficial to humanity. We do not consider the possibility that the supreme value could be indifferent or even harmful to human beings.

Just as we once believed the cosmos revolved around us, this physical anthropocentrism is mirrored by 'axiological anthropocentrism'—the view that supreme value is centred around humanity. But what if, in fact, the supreme value has nothing to do with humanity—is of no benefit to us, has no connection with us, or is even harmful?
The idea of a supreme value that could simultaneously be our supreme end might be a wish or cherished dream, which may indeed prove true at the conclusion of our axiological inquiry; however, it cannot serve as a presupposition for our investigation, much less as an unconscious assumption hidden within the very concepts we use to pose this question. In other words, using the concept of finality to frame the problem of values distorts it, as we unknowingly commit ourselves to an anthropocentric perspective.

One possibility remains: Aristotle may never have intended to pose the problem of values but rather to investigate what is best for human beings. Put differently, Aristotle may not have examined whether a universal hierarchy of all beings exists but rather focused on what is most desirable and advantageous for humans—a pursuit distinct from the problem of values. He states this explicitly, for instance, when he says, Clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness ¹.

It is not surprising, then, that Aristotle considers happiness the supreme end: it is, obviously (and tautologically), what is most advantageous to us, what makes us happiest.
Aristotle notes that Verbally, there is a very general agreement [about supreme good]; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and many do not give the same account as the wise ². This consensus arises from the fact that it is a tautology, one that no one can dispute.

To sum up, either Aristotle does not pose the axiological question at all, content to ask about the human good—what has value for us—or he poses it in terms that betray it. From the outset, this approach dogmatically (and without examination) grants two assumptions about the greatest value: that it is desired by us and that it is an end for us.
We may conclude that the concept of finality is unsuited as a foundation for axiology, and that any 'ethics of ends' can only be tautological or dogmatic, depending on the question it asks.
Above all, we must conclude that value and end are two irreducible concepts—distinct and non-interchangeable.

If value is neither the good nor the end, it becomes difficult to define what it could be. Perhaps we can settle on this minimal (and thus solid) definition: value is the quality of a thing. Is not the search for a thing’s value essentially the search for its qualities? This is the hypothesis we will now explore.

1. Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13
2. Ibid. I, 4