4/ Conclusion: The Notion of Value as Irreducible to All Others
Our reflection leads to this conclusion: the concept of value has been confused with related but distinct concepts, such as 'good' and 'end'. Consequently, the problem of values has been mistaken for the problem of the supreme good or the supreme end, even though these are fundamentally different issues. By substituting one problem for another, we have effectively caused the problem of values to disappear, since it could never be properly posed given this mistaken formulation.
Other such substitutions can be identified, though I will mention them only briefly. The notion of 'value' has often been confused with 'meaning', leading to the conflation of the problem of values with questions such as 'Is there a meaning to life?' or 'Is there a meaning to history?' Similarly, 'value' has often been wrongly equated with 'right' and 'reality' with 'nature', resulting in the confusion of the axiological question 'Is there anything that truly has value?' with the political question 'Is there a natural right?' (in the sense of a right that is legitimate, i.e. one that has value).
The difference between these questions is clear. History could have a meaning (say, the progress of the human species), yet an axiological position could still maintain that neither humanity, art, nor technology has any value, and that human progress (whether artistic, technical, or otherwise) is therefore valueless. Equally, finding meaning in one's life (through an activity that brings fulfilment, for instance) does not imply that the value of that life has been established in any way. One can also imagine an axiological position holding that what has value is meaninglessness and chaos, and thus affirming a life or a history with no fixed direction.
Similarly, even if we were able to settle the question of whether natural law exists, and to identify each of its prescriptions, we would not thereby have made the slightest progress towards resolving the problem of values. The view that nature provides the foundation of values lacks any factual basis, and it is perfectly conceivable to adopt an axiological position asserting that what truly has value transcends nature, contradicts or surpasses it—an idea that is perhaps at the root of science, as well as of the notions of progress and culture—whether or not it is possible to go beyond nature in practice. It would then be pointless to show that a given behaviour violates natural law, precisely to someone who holds that what has value is to free oneself from nature.
Thus, even if we had somehow resolved the question of the meaning of life, of history, or of the existence of natural law, we would still not have come any closer to the core issue of what truly has value. It would have been worthwhile to examine the notions of natural law and the meaning of history or life more closely, in order to show how the axiological question becomes transformed—and thereby lost—in each case; but such an investigation cannot be undertaken here.
We may therefore conclude that the notion of value is irreducible to any other concept, and that the confusions with related concepts are illegitimate.
The fact that these related concepts are moral in character, or belong to the field of ethics (good, end, and so on), has led to axiology being absorbed into morality, and the problem of values being treated as an ethical matter.
What are the consequences of this absorption of axiology by ethics? This is the question I propose to explore next.