What is the source of Platonic confusion? It stems from the fact that the Greek word agathon has such a broad scope that it encompasses all the meanings associated with the word 'good'. Thus, like the English word 'good', it is an ambiguous term. As a result, we cannot discern which of these six meanings is intended by the word agathon when we encounter it. However, the translation presents no difficulty: we translate the ambiguous term agathon with the equally ambiguous term 'good', merely deferring the problem. The task of inferring the author's intended meaning of 'good' is thus left to the reader.

By consulting the Republic alone, we can find each of these meanings for the term agathon. For example:
- 'Usefulness': That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good. ¹
From this idea, Plato derives the following question: Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one? ².
- 'Morally good': Are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures? so The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? ³.
- Value in itself, when Plato defines good as being the sun of the intelligible world ⁴, at the top of the hierarchy.

It now seems clear that the concept of 'good' is ill-suited to an adequate formulation of the problem of values, since its various meanings bundle several distinct questions into a single term. Nor does this ambiguity result from a gradual historical shift in meaning; it has been inherent since the concept's Greek ancestor, agathon.

To sidestep this difficulty, we should look for a different, more fitting concept with which to approach the axiological problem. But which concept should we choose?

The various meanings of 'good' appear to share a common thread: they all refer to something appealing to human beings, something that may be considered a purpose. One can strive to fulfil one's duty, take pleasure in something, pursue happiness, or seek out useful and valuable objects. The concept of finality unifies all these meanings, and this prompts us to ask whether we might reframe the concept of the good by focusing on the idea that seems to underlie it—one that appears more fundamental than the others: finality, or ultimate purpose.

Can we determine the value of something through the concept of finality? Two considerations point in this direction. First, it seems that we must understand the end purpose of something in order to determine its value. For instance, we can assess the value of a pair of shoes only if we know their purpose (walking) and can determine whether they fulfil it (Are they comfortable? Do they have holes?). Second, the quest for a supreme value likely aligns with the search for a supreme end purpose. But is this truly the case?

This approach appears promising. We will now examine the writings of Aristotle, who offers the most robust representation of it.

1. Republic, 608e
2. Ibid., 462b
3. Ibid., 505c
4. Ibid., 509a