We have just seen what, for these theories, the axiological problem consists of: can we find relations between the different values? In other words, the problem concerning values lies not in their foundation, but in their connection. The foundation of these values is not seen as problematic; these authors never question whether concepts like the beautiful, the true, and the good are indeed values—they simply take this as given.
Perhaps we can therefore say that the problem of values has remained ignored by these authors, because it lies precisely in the fact that no value can be taken for granted, and that the aim of axiological enquiry is precisely to determine what does and does not have value. So these theories do not aim to solve the problem of values: in fact, for them, there is no problem at all; in their self-assurance, they have remained deaf to exactly what challenges the researcher's efforts.

However, these theories are not only flawed because they fail to raise the problem; they also hinder us from posing it by distorting the concept of value itself, resulting in the problematic notion of 'values' in the plural. In contrast, the hypothesis I wish to support is that the concept of value only makes sense in the singular. To support this, we must retrace the reasoning that leads these theories to their conclusion.

First, it is correctly observed that many distinct things can have value: a painting, courage, pride, etc. A surreptitious inference then arises: these things, which possess a value, are themselves considered values. In other words, what has value becomes a value in itself. Thus, we shift from the verb 'to have' to the verb 'to be', without any legitimisation whatsoever. 'X has value' becomes 'X is a value'. Since X can be many things, as we have seen, we deduce that there is a plurality of values, i.e. we wrongly deduce the plurality of kinds of values from the plurality of objects that have value. This deduction is flawed, as it relies on a curious grammatical confusion between the verbs 'to be' and 'to have': there is, after all, a crucial difference between saying 'a man has a nose' and 'a man is a nose.'

Secondly, since the X in question that we say has - or is - a value is most often a quality (beautiful, just, good), we confuse value and quality, a confusion that we must now examine, since it is the second cause that leads us to posit value in the plural.
By quality, we mean a property traditionally considered to have value: beautiful, funny, intelligent, useful, efficient, convenient, and sober, are all qualities. The theory we oppose maintains that these qualities will each give rise to a different kind of value; for example, the quality 'beautiful' would be nothing other than aesthetic value; or the quality 'good' represents moral value.
We must acknowledge the direct consequence that appears to follow from this idea: the outright disappearance of value. For if this is the case, asking about values would merely involve questioning whether something is good, beautiful, or, more generally, whether a given thing possesses a particular quality.

On the contrary, it seems to me that the enquiry into values has an entirely different purpose: its aim is not to determine whether a given act is moral (or has moral value), but to determine whether morality has value or not. Its aim is not to determine whether a given object is beautiful, convenient, or useful, but rather to determine the value of beauty, convenience, or usefulness, and, more broadly, of all qualities. This suggests that value is not simply a quality, but rather something that a quality may possess or lack.
Thus, quality fundamentally differs from value in that a quality either possesses or lacks value (the possessor is distinct from the possessed). Value emerges now as irreducible to quality, as an autonomous entity that we must think of for itself: value appears where it had previously disappeared.