This indeed amounts to a disappearance, as becomes clear when we examine what the theory actually asserts. If 'to seek moral value is to seek what is moral', one wonders what additional meaning the concept of value in the quoted sentence actually provides. It seems that it is nothing but an empty shell, a sound that supports no concept: the concept of value disappears entirely under that of morality.
Similarly, if we maintain that 'to seek aesthetic value is to seek what is beautiful', we see that the concept of value fades behind that of beauty, losing any independent meaning. Finally, and more broadly, if we claim that 'to seek the value of a quality X is to seek what is X', we strip the concept of value of all meaning. Or rather, the only meaning it is likely to have is that of essence; in other words, we consider that to seek the value of X is to determine what is part of the essence of X. However, the concept of value is obviously radically different from that of essence.

So perhaps we can see the aberrations to which the confusion of value and quality leads us. If, however, we acknowledge that they are two autonomous concepts, irreducible to each other, we then free the concept of value, allowing it to unfold in its own specificity, and enable ourselves to understand the axiological question: does this or that quality X have value?

We then realise that value 'overhangs' the notion of quality, as it is based on value that all qualities are examined in the axiological enquiry, or that value is meta-qualitative (if 'meta' means external to and superior to), belonging to an entirely different sphere from that of qualities. This reveals the proper domain of axiology: its purpose is not to ask whether something is just, beautiful, true, etc., but to ask whether justice, beauty, truth, etc. have value. In fact, it leaves it to morality, aesthetics and science to determine whether something is just, beautiful or true.

We are not seeking to determine whether morality has moral value, beauty has aesthetic value, courage has courageous value, or fear has fearful value; rather, we seek to establish whether all these qualities possess value—a concept whose meaning remains unchanged regardless of the quality. Thus, as far as we can determine, there are no kinds of value. For this reason, I propose the following conclusion: value only has meaning in the singular.
Nevertheless, because the term 'values' in the plural has become established in usage, we will continue to use it while insisting that doing so does not imply the existence of several kinds of value.
This confusion, which may appear merely grammatical, seems to have had significant consequences, which I now propose to examine.

The human sciences seem to pursue an ideal of scientificity and objectivity (though many researchers critically distance themselves from this ideal), translating it into a principle of neutrality, which we define as follows: the prohibition of any appeal to value in explaining a historical or social phenomenon. Or again, the prohibition on mixing judgements of fact and judgements of value. A strictly scientific explanation must avoid any form of value judgement; only factual judgements, along with hypotheses for linking, classifying, and explaining these facts, are permitted.
Since value has been conflated with qualities, it is not only value that has been excluded from the field of human sciences, but qualities as well. Our distinction between value and quality prompts us to reconsider the legitimacy of this exclusion, at least concerning qualities.